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ABSTRACT
My dissertation aims to disrupt an increasingly ubiquitous view of epistemology which
claim that we can study rationality by considering a single belief at a single time. I target
three areas where diachronic (i.e. temporal) factors make a difference in the three sections:
1. memory, a system of tremendous importance in our cognitive lives yet which is often
reduced to a one-sided question of whether to trust what one’s memory says,
2. learning, where I argue that we should sometimes believe in a way that’s not war-
ranted or reasonable in light of our current evidence, but which puts us in a better
position to acquire evidence in the future, and
3. the connection between memory and learning, as exemplified in the case of remem-
bering anomalous events.
While many disciplines dealing with memory have come to the view that it is not a pas-
sive system for recording and preserving the data of experience, most extant philosophical
accounts implicitly or explicitly make the assumption that storage is nonetheless memory’s
core function - other characteristics are secondary or derivative. In Chapter II, I aim to
restructure the problem, moving the focus from storage to retrieval the ability to pull up
relevant and accurate information on demand. On my view, the memory system is different
from active mental processes such as deliberation only by degree (i.e., it is slower to up-
date) and in virtue of how it is connected with other faculties (memory tends to be updated
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off-line, rather than in concert with decision-making and perception). I call this the model’
view of memory.
In Chapter III, I extend a decision-theoretic concept (the exploration-exploitation trade-
off) to the case of belief. The trade-off is between picking the best-looking option, and
picking the option most likely to lead to learning. For belief, this connection is grounded in
the connection between our current beliefs and our dispositions to act in more or less exper-
imental ways and to explore the space of possibilities (in a process that I call imaginative
search). These acts - experimentation and imaginative search - change what evidence we
have, and yet at the same time also depend causally and rationally on what we believe. We
perform one experiment over another because of our beliefs about what is probably true of
the system we’re studying, and what the result of the experiment would tell us about that
system. The same goes for imagination, albeit more controversially.
In Chapters IV and V, I analyze the rationality of selective memory for unexpected
events. Chapter IV surveys empirical work on anomalous memories, in order to under-
stand the rationality of the cognitive process underlying these curious states . Where does
remembering anomalous events fit into the behavior of an epistemically responsible agent?
I argue that generating and maintaining anomalous memories is a distinctive rational func-
tion of the long term memory system. This claim has two parts. First, this kind of cognitive
behavior is epistemically rational. Second, it is a cognitive operation that is particular to
the memory system, meaning that the operation itself is a memory operation as opposed
to a computation that just happens to take place in the memory system. And so this con-
clusion entails that memory itself has a distinctive, active epistemic role. Chapter V uses
the case of anomalous memories as a jumping-off point to ask: do we believe everything
we remember? I resurrect a medieval view of mental states, based on a theory advanced
by Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, which factors our belief-like states into two components: concep-
tualization and commitment. On this analysis, the thing we typically call belief is a small
corner of a larger space that includes the variety of ways we build memory representations
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and use those representations to guide us.
This project is important because our whole lives are organized around getting things
right at the right time. When we try to act morally, we might try to have a life that is
built around moral principles, or to become wiser and kinder over time, as opposed to
amassing a collection of acts that all have independent moral value. I think the same thing
is true of our endeavors to acquire knowledge the process of inquiry is not made up of
individual, independent good inferences that happen to follow one another, but is instead
about a trajectory where we learn over time, and take the right steps now to get things
right in the future, and overall. So I think that to understand this more complete sense of
inquiry, philosophy needs to make a place for memory, the system that sustains and directs
inquiry in the background, over long periods of time even as the sciences are learning
more and more about how natural memory systems work, philosophers have boxed it out of
relevance.My methodology is to study natural and artificial learning and memory systems
as a process of discovery, a way of using real-world cases as inspiration and guide to the
normative landscape. Conversely, I hope that figuring out new normative possibilities can




I started the project that would become this dissertation by thinking about reversal learn-
ing in rodents. In a simple learning task that involves this skill, rats have learned the loca-
tion of an underwater platform, and are now quite successful at swimming to that platform
when put into the tank. Then, the location of the platform is changed, and the rat must
find the new location on subsequent trials. This ability, to identify when old information
is no longer relevant and replace it with new information, is linked to REM sleep; rats that
are REM-deprived do much worse at adapting to the new location, and are more likely to
return to the old location. Studying the neural processing behind this ability to re-learn,
something began to bother me.
There is something more complex behind reversal learning. The rat does not just learn
that the platform was here and now it is there. It also reconfigures its behavior in response
to this change, so that it will swim in the right direction. This in turn involves re-working
an existing model of the environment, and the rat’s own body, to plot a new route. What
began to bother me is that it seems like this kind of learning requires sleep for a reason
- roughly, because undoing existing connections and moving things around is hard to do
when you are actively relying on the model for behavior. But my philosophical toolbox
did not offer any way to explain what is special about this kind of learning, or why it
naturally takes place off-line. Most of the epistemology I was familiar with was about
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learning the generic proposition P, and didn’t seem to be sensitive to differences between
the types of things being learned. Likewise, most philosophical models of learning that
I was familiar with were insensitive to when learning should take place, and ignored the
possibility of learning during sleep. This bothered me because it seemed like there was
actually something normatively significant about reversal learning, about the differences
between learning and un-learning, and about the trajectory of learning the environment
across time and changes in routine and cognition.
You might be unconvinced that any of this is actually of philosophical significance. But
the aim of this dissertation is to change your mind, and to provide a theoretical, normative
foundation for thinking about features of learning, un-learning and re-learning over long
timespans. These chapters are meant to stand on their own, but together they build an
epistemology that is attentive to the thinker as an agent moving through time and facing a
series of related challenges. The picture that emerges of epistemic rationality deviates from
the orthodoxy in various ways - which is to say that the decision to focus on a single point
in time or an extended trajectory is normatively significant.
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CHAPTER II
Memory is a Modeling System
ABSTRACT. This paper aims to reconfigure the place of memory in epistemology. I
start by rethinking the problem that memory systems solve; rather than merely functioning
to store information, I argue that the core function of any memory system is to support
accurate and relevant retrieval. This problem formulation has consequences for what struc-
tures and mechanisms make up a memory system. In brief, memory systems are modeling
systems. This means that they generate, update and manage a series of overlapping, simpli-
fied, relational representations that map out features of the world. Succeeding at building
and maintaining models requires the kind of active knowledge generation traditionally as-
sociated only with deliberative reasoning.
Introduction
I’ll start with an analogy. Some philosophers think that memory works like a museum.
It’s a place where old things are collected and stored over time. These old things are
important not just because they are interesting and informative, but also because they are
authentic links to our shared past. The function of the museum is simple: be a receptacle for
these old things. A good museum is the right temperature so that the artifacts don’t degrade
- and likewise, on this picture, a good memory system maintains a cognitive environment
to keep the items stored in memory in as close to their original condition as possible. In
any real museum, items do degrade and need to be touched up and patched. But the idea of
keeping things in the original condition is a guiding norm. Similarly, while human memory
might involve alterations to the stored information, the system is still aiming at or guided
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by the norm of perfect preservation. A recent trend, constructivism, rejects the museum
picture entirely. For instance, Michaelian [65] makes the case that memory just is a kind of
imagining - it has no special relationship to preserved content at all.
On the view I develop in this paper, memory is indeed analogous to a museum, though
not in the way I’ve just described. To explain, I’ll sketch a different picture of how museums
function. While they do usually contain some old and authentic artifacts, there is more to
a good museum than good preservation. For one, there’s a team of curators who arrange
exhibits. This involves choosing what to display - but perhaps more importantly, organizing
a series of objects around a theme or narrative. For instance, a curator might plan an
exhibit about Turgenev. She would choose an angle - say, exploring his literary circle and
emphasizing connections between France, Russia and England. The choice of a theme
will depend on the artifacts at her disposal, but it also will determine which she chooses to
display. The same goes for the process of arranging the exhibit and generating displays like
maps, captions and installations. In the process of making a map, she’ll realize it would be
helpful to display a postcard from Turgenev’s travel to Italy or in the process of arranging
a set of letters, she’ll realize it would be helpful to have a chart of his correspondence. A
museum, in this sense, is an active institution as opposed to a passive repository. And this
is most obvious when we consider the distinctive job of curation that occurs in museums.
Thus on this analogy, we can position alternative views of the computational function
of memory on a scale from memory having the most active role in information operations
to the most passive role. On the first extreme, the exhibits in the museum might be purely
generated by the curators, incorporating no received artifacts and relying on minimal ex-
ternal resources. This view is of course memory constructivism. On the other extreme,
the traditional memory preservationism, the curators merely carry out instructions given to
them from outside.
In this paper, I’ll argue that memory is somewhere between these two extremes, and op-
erates a lot like an actual museum. In particular, the memory system performs an epistemic
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activity which is analogous to curation, which I’ll call modeling. This operation is aimed
at structuring and altering its contents in order to make correct, useful and relevant infor-
mation available for retrieval. I’ll contrast this picture to both the initial museum analogy,
where memory is aimed at authenticity and preservation, and to the constructivist account
on which memory is a system of imaginative simulation. Just as curatorial work is mainly
done when the museum is closed to visitors, the memory operations I’m interested in oc-
cur during sleep and in the background during waking, rather than being conscious, online
processes.
This paper aims to answer two questions in the epistemology of memory: (1) what is
the epistemic role of memory, i.e. the role of memory in generating knowledge? and (2)
which features of the memory system are epistemically evaluable? My answer to these
normative questions is inspired by recent work in computer science and neuroscience that
has allowed us to dissect natural and artificial memory systems and better understand the
problems which they succeed at solving.
While this account is about memory in general, I make several assumptions about the
evidential context of the agent in question: (a) the agent has a set of evidence which is
small relative to the total possible evidence about propositions which interest the agent, (b)
the agent can expect to get more information over time that (at least in part) bears on the
same propositions, and (c) the agent is handling a large amount of complex information.
Roughly, human memory falls into a class of systems solving a common problem: how
to use large quantities of information under conditions of uncertainty when you expect to
accumulate more and more in the future. This could apply to humans or other agents such
as rats or primates, as well as machines that fall short of full agency, such as a database or
specialized artificial intelligence.
Conditions (a)-(c) are plausible claims about most of our cognitive circumstances, but
they are meant to capture something more specific: namely, what it means to be in the
beginning of inquiry. I’ll argue that given these conditions, memory isn’t just a system for
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storing information, but actually has its own procedures and norms for generating new con-
tent and revising old content. On this picture, memory is differentiated from deliberation
only by its degree of holistic connection and overall conservativeness.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2.1, I lay out the claim that retrieval
is central to memory, and support it with empirical evidence that suggests retrieval is the
most significant bottleneck in successful memory function. The museum analogy suggests
that our memory systems are doing work in the background to update and change stored
information; in Section 2.2, I show that active information transformation is happening
during sleep in humans and other animals based on neuroscientific research. Understanding
which transformations are happening and why requires a conceptual model. In Section 2.3,
I describe two informational structures that solve the retrieval problem - first, a model
system that structures the data in a series of simplified models, and second, an index system,
which uses an intermediate structured representation between the query and the underlying
unstructured storage system. I define these two types and present instances of real-world
model and index devices. In Section 2.4, I argue that the model system is a better fit for
memory in an ideal agent, by showing that as computational constraints are relaxed, index
systems transform into model systems. In Section 2.5, I survey some views of memory in
the philosophical literature, and show that they are problematic given the norm described
in Section 2.1. I conclude by considering an objection that the model view isn’t at the right
level of abstraction, and discussing some consequences of the model view.
2.1 From Storage to Retrieval
Here’s a seemingly trivial fact: memory systems must make their stored information
available for retrieval. However, this fact that has been given short shrift in the current
epistemological literature. If we think of memory as a process that begins with some ex-
perience and leads to a later experience of remembering, most philosophers have focused
on the experience of remembering itself. Memory constructivists like Michaelian[65], for
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instance, are interested in how we are able to fill out the details and construct a model
of the past when having the experience of remembering, or shortly before. On the other
hand, making stored information available for retrieval is a process that starts as soon as we
have an experience, and is ongoing until the experience of remembering and afterwards.
This is a process over days, months or years which determines what gets remembered; the
constructivist is concerned with a process that takes minutes which determines how the
experience of remembering is generated and experienced.
What is retrieval? It’s a process in which a system supplies an item or set of items that
relate to a query. Queries can be explicit - such as when I deliberately search my memories
to find my brother’s girlfriend’s name - or implicit - such as when seeing a person’s face
cues a memory of their name. Retrieval in fact involves two processes working together.
In the long run, stored information must be structured so that important things can be
retrieved. In the short run, search has to operate on stored representations successfully to
locate relevant stored content.
Retrieval is a functional bottleneck for memory, a step in the process to which many
failures and successes can be traced. This holds for both animals and artificial systems. In
using this fact to argue for the normative centrality of retrieval, I’ll assume that one of the
theoretical virtues that makes for a good account of the function of a biological system is
that it can explain common successes and failures.
Research on human memory suggests that retrieval is a major source of memory failures[88].
One way of seeing this intuitively is to think of all the times you couldn’t remember some
fact that later came to you easily in a different context.In computer memory systems, where
it’s fairly easy to tack on another server or hard disk or some other storage device, the re-
trieval problem is even more prominent; consider how much improvements in web search
facilitate our use of information. One could argue this is just a feature of the peculiar
strengths and weaknesses in our technology, but it’s significant insofar as it aligns with
the challenges found in biological memory systems. The fact that retrieval shows up as
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the factor which separates successful from unsuccessful memory systems across the board
suggests that retrieval is a challenging computation even at a high level of abstraction.
Strategies to enhance retrieval are central to memory expertise in humans. The Method
of Loci (MoL) is a strategy used by memory experts as far back as Roman times[25], and
notably described by A.R. Luria as used by the brilliant mnemonist Shereshevsky[58]. An
example of this technique would be memorizing a list of unrelated names by visualizing
placing each name in a familiar location on a walk around my childhood neighborhood.
Then, to retrieve the items, I would again visualize my walk through the neighborhood,
this time picking up each name one by one. The MoL is not just used by experts but can
be taught to older adults to improve memory performance[45][30]. The MoL is a retrieval
strategy because it involves structuring one’s memories so that they can be effectively re-
trieved later, and prescribes a specific strategy for that retrieval process. The symmetry
between how the memory is stored (in a visualization of the childhood home) and then
consequently retrieved is striking, and illustrates the property of retrieval I discussed above:
effective retrieval involves tight cooperation between how information is stored, and how
it is searched.
Another line of evidence is retrieval pathologies such as enhanced retrieval in Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). While many extant philosophical discussions of mem-
ory [11] [63] refer to the case of H.M. who had traumatic damage to his memory system
which affected storage, a far more common memory pathology is intrusive memory. Pa-
tients with PTSD experience intrusive memories. In these memories, a traumatic incident is
remembered vividly and often. This is not because the traumatic memory is often relevant,
but because something is wrong with the process of retrieval which privileges a certain set
of memories (the traumatic ones) without good reason. This may be because of the stored
memory itself, or the way in which memory is searched and cued, but most likely involves
failures that run through the stages of the retrieval process.
So if retrieval keeps showing up as the key step in memory, we should expect a good
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theory of memory function even at an abstract philosophical level to either explain why this
is or provide a basis for such an explanation. An objection to this way of thinking about
memory function might be that for ideal epistemic agents, retrieval is inessential. Perhaps
these agents can access all their stored representations instantly in parallel, or maybe the
idea of access as a process itself presumes the system in question is non-ideal.
I concede that under some notion of the ideal agent, this objection is correct. God
probably would not need a function to get information from his memory system. So one
response is to be more specific about what I mean an ideal agent: a creature that carries
out the same operations as we do, but is not limited absolutely by computational difficulty.
That is, this kind of agent is capable of doing any algorithmically specified computation, but
not, say, processing uncomputable functions. I’m also presuming that we can still talk about
efficiency for such an agent. This might seem odd, but it strikes me as an assumption shared
by classic Bayesian epistemology, as well as other algorithmic but idealized frameworks.
For instance, the Bayesian advocates for conditionalization, but does not take herself to
be obligated to rule out the procedure of first transforming the credences linearly, then
conditionalizing, then re-transforming. Presumably this is because that would be no better,
and much less efficient, than conditionalizing.
In my case, I’m appealing to efficiency to support the necessity of retrieval for the
ideal agent in the following way: were the agent not to intelligently store and structure her
representations in order to optimize them for retrieval, she might still be able to function at
the same level by employing an extremely complicated and computationally costly retrieval
mechanism. However, efficiency would best be served by having a retrieval function and
representational structure that work together.
One further thing to establish is the criterion for successful retrieval. I will assume that
this consists in two features: (a) truth/accuracy, and (b) relevance/completeness 1. This
1in computer science, relevance/completeness is referred to as the recall/precision trade-off; these trade-
offs both refer to the fact that the more inclusive search results are, the less they can precisely pinpoint
connections between the query and the retrieved items
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means that the information accessed in response to a query must be on topic, not omit
anything of clear importance, and of course, be true or accurate. One thing you might
expect to see in addition to (a) and (b) is something like faithfulness, or accuracy to the
past representation, rather than to a state of affairs in the world. However, faithfulness is
not needed to characterize retrieval, and in fact, as I’ll discuss later, is often at odds with
retrieval.
So I have argued that retrieval is integral to successful epistemic functioning in memory,
and that successful retrieval consists in storage and search that makes available true and
relevant information. Retrieval is a central norm for memory, in this sense, because it
defines a function that differentiates memory success from memory failures across many
cases and in many systems; it is not a norm in the sense that any particular memory system
or agent necessarily should attempt to satisfy this function, or use this norm as a goal to
actively guide processing.
2.2 Sleep and Memory
Animals, including humans, seem to be fairly successful at solving the retrieval prob-
lem. We are exposed to an incredible amount of information every day, and yet manage to
pull out important facts to highlight and be reminded of later. This suggests that looking at
animal memory system might tell us something about how the problem can be solved, and
what systems that solve the retrieval problem have in common.
In this section, I’ll aim to ground 2 claims: (1) functionally, information stored in
animal memory systems tends to acquire “model-like” features over time, and (2) these
features are developed, updated and maintained primarily or at least to a significant degree
by the memory system. I’ll examine what it means to be model-like in Section 2.3, but for
now, the idea is to let the data guide us toward a sense of what these information changes
have in common. (2) is necessary to rule out the reasonable hypothesis that on-line delib-




I’ll now turn to the connection between sleep and memory in animals. I’ll focus on sleep
because what’s at issue between the various theories is whether the memory system itself
performs information transformations. Because we neither deliberate nor perceive during
sleep, informational changes that happen in memory during sleep can be attributed more
cleanly to the memory system itself as opposed to deliberation or perceptual processing.
So sleep takes some possible confounding variables out of the equation.
Every theory on the continuum from preservationism to constructivism can accommo-
date sleep having some effect on memory. What happens in memory during sleep, however,
could be understood under very different hypotheses depending on the background theory:
1. Tagging hypothesis: Deliberative systems tag information changes which are carried
out by the memory system (but neither designed or planned by the memory system)
2. Index hypothesis: Memory systems build an index during sleep (to a lesser degree
during waking) which is used to pull data from a long term, relatively inert, storage
system.
3. Model hypothesis: Memory systems build and alter models during sleep (to a lesser
degree during waking) which are used directly in retrieval.
4. Constructive hypothesis: memory is an online process of imagination and so should
not be implicated in sleep except in the way that all cognitive operations tend to
degrade in conditions of sleep deprivation.
The tagging hypothesis about memory is a way of articulating that memory is informa-
tionally inert and therefor fits with preservationism. On the model and index hypotheses,
memory performs informational operations, analogous to the kind of curation introduced
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in the museum analogy. I won’t get into the differences between these two views until
the next section; instead, I’ll focus on what they have in common. Namely, both predict
that animal memory systems, to be successful at solving the retrieval problem, should al-
ter stored representations to make them simpler, more cohesive, and structured according
to patterns and generalizations. I’ll argue that the data strongly favors both the index and
model hypotheses over the tagging and constructive hypotheses. Note that while construc-
tivism and preservationism are two ends of the spectrum, they generate virtually the same
prediction here, since both minimize off-line information processing in memory 2.
2.2.2 Data
While there has been a lot of behavioral and higher-level work on long-term changes
to memories (most famously by Elizabeth Loftus [57]) and other phenomena which might
support my view, in this section I’ll concentrate on low-level neuroscientific data3. Addi-
tionally, the model I’m presenting is meant to be a reinterpretation of a swath of research
that investigates the influence of environment and more generally prior beliefs on memory
4. These models often either give a fully general, domain-neutral theory [3] [46], or focus
on small-scale, particular schemas [90]. My project is to give a redescription under which
these results are picking out pieces of the same underlying phenomenon.
At a minimum, it’s clear that in humans, rodents and drosophila, sleep is critical for
memory consolidation. The task of this section is to argue that what happens during sleep
is likely to be a process of organization and prioritization. If animal memory is a model
2This is one reason I do not consider constructivism in depth in this paper. However, more importantly,
constructivism is a theory of episodic memory and this paper discusses memory at a higher degree of general-
ity. As such, the overall memory system might be a model system, and there could be some element of scene
construction using that system that we classify as episodic memory. Or put another way: constructivism [65]
presupposes the existence of a separate storage (and by my lights, retrieval) system that supplies imaginative
construction with its content.
3This is in part because these kind of structural question can be answered most directly by looking at
mechanisms, but also because the findings I discuss in this section have gotten less attention in the context of
these abstract debates about memory function
4It’s worth noting that some models - such as Zhang and Luck [98] - explain data of the kind I’ll discuss
without any direct influence of priors on memory (in their case, by a combination of straight remembering
and on-line guessing). However, this is plausibly due to differences between working and long-term memory.
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system, then these are precisely the features we should expect. On the contrary, other views
do not predict this. That suggests an explanatory advantage in favor of the model view.
Several patterns have been well established in the research on the link between hu-
man and rodent memory operations and sleep, including the following: enhancement for
weak rather than strong memories [32], preferential enhancement of goal-related mem-
ories [94][32], and enhancement of temporal ordering information [35][44][32]. All of
these facets indicate that informational transformations are occurring. Another line of evi-
dence against the tagging view is the two-way connection between memory enhancement
and sleep - in studies in drosophila, researchers found that increasing the memory demand
in the environment increased time spent asleep, directly stimulating brain regions respon-
sible for memory increased sleep [33], and enhancing sleep chemically reduced memory
deficits [34].These interventional studies indicate that at least in flies, there is a genuine
causal connection between memory and sleep.
To look at one finding in some more depth, Drosopoulos et al [35] looked at consoli-
dation of temporally ordered information in humans in a sleep and control condition. They
used repeat sequences to separate temporal ordering effects from more general ordering
effects. Consistent with other work [32] they found sleep only strengthened the forward
temporal sequence and not the backwards one - that is, subjects who had slept between
training and testing were no better than those who had not at the task of naming which
cue came before some cue that was shown to them. However, they did significantly better
than the non-sleeping group at naming which cue came after a cue that was presented to
them. A second finding was that weak associations were strengthened more than stronger
ones - if an associated was less reliable during the training session, it was more likely to be
improved in the testing session.
This and other behavioral effects of sleep have increasingly clear neural correlates, at
least in rodent models. For instance, Bendor et al[10] taught rats an association between
a tone (left or right), and the location of food (at the left or right end of a track respec-
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tively). Following training, the authors recorded from hippocampal neurons. Critically,
these neurons represent a spatial map of the environment, and go through ‘replay’ during
slow wave sleep, in which patterns of activation experienced during waking are repeated
multiple times in the same order during sleep. They played three sounds (the left and right
tones used in the training phase, and an unconditioned control tone) during the two sleep
phases as well as waking. Playing the left tone during REM sleep (but not slow wave sleep
or waking) enhanced hippocampal replay in the left region of the place field, i.e. the part
of the neuronal ensemble that represents the left half of the environment. The same was
found for the right tone. Further, playing either tone lead to behavioral changes; the rats
were more likely to make errors in favor of the side on which the tone was played during
REM sleep. We have copious evidence of a correlation between hippocampal consolidation
during sleep and changes in waking behavior, but this experiment suggests a clear causal
connection; by biasing signals during REM sleep, the experimenters biased the neural pat-
terns at consolidation, as well as the behaviors during subsequent testing. That is, not only
does hippocampal consolidation parallel the information transformations I’ve been talking
about, but it’s likely that changes in consolidation drive changes in behaviors.
These two lines of evidence (informational effects and causal connection) count against
the tagging view in the following way. Since the tagging view says that activity during
sleep is merely carrying out the instructions generated during waking, it should predict
that stronger associations have an equal or greater sleep boost than weak ones. The causal
studies indicate that there is a two-way relationship at play, since enhancing sleep enhances
memory and learning.
The model view predicts a computationally taxing and critical period of consolidation,
since models have to be assembled and designed in a non-trivial way. One line of evidence
in support of this claim is sleep-linked memory triage. This is a broad category that encom-
passes many ways in which information acquired during the day is altered and consolidated
during sleep. In selective item consolidation, subjects tend to forget items which don’t fit
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into a pattern (for fMRI corroboration on this point see [76]), and reinforce those that do.
In multi-item integration, a new stimulus that fits into an existing pattern will be integrated
with that pattern, and in gist extraction, a pattern will be generalized leading to confabulat-
ing items which fit in with the pattern but were not presented. To simplify a little, it seems
like consolidation during sleep is important for fitting new memories into existing patterns,
and extracting new patterns.
The phenomena of information transformations like gist extraction is compatible with
a wide range of memory structures, though the idea of active forgetting [76] makes some
trouble for a strict preservationist picture. What I take to support the model view is that
this consolidation takes place during sleep. If reasoning or other on-line processes were
responsible for gist extraction and generalization, we would expect items that didn’t fit into
a pattern to be recalled less even without a period of sleep before testing. However, there
is a significant sleep-dependent boost for each of the three effects I’ve discussed [94]. One
explanation for this draws on the neurochemical environment during REM and transition-
to-REM (TR) sleep. Poe et al note that the low acetylcholine and high norepinephrine
during these phases facilitates long term depotentiation, the reversal or dissolution of long
term potentiation, which is often described as the neural correlate of associative strength-
ening [69].
Sleep-linked processing is by definition off-line, and the neural correlates of these con-
solidation processes indicate areas associated with memory, rather than other reasoning or
learning processes [69]. So it seems likely that these operations are operations of the mem-
ory system itself. First, this evidence is predicted by the model view, since consolidation
will involve integrating new evidence into existing representations, which has the automatic
consequence of generating inferences along the lines of the confabulation cases, where the
subject claims to have seen an unseen stimulus ‘EFG’, which follows the 3-letter pattern of
the stimuli which they actually saw.
Stepping back from the details of memory consolidation, another line of evidence ap-
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peals to the division of the memory system into episodic and semantic components. Se-
mantic and episodic remembering are two ways of representing which can share some
representational content (for instance, I can semantically remember that Fatima was the
daughter of Mohammad, or I could episodically remember my teacher telling me that Fa-
tima was his daughter). Whether I prefer one form over the other depends on what features
of the information I deem relevant. If I doubt that my teacher is a reliable source, I might
want to remember that it was him who told me that fact just in case I get more evidence
about his reliability. In other words, the choice of format, just as with models more gener-
ally, is relevant for determining how that information will change over time. The challenge
for the model view is showing that these large scale patterns are replicated at a lower level.
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What does all this data tell us? It paints a picture on which after sleep, our memories are
more organized, combined and structured according to patterns, and sometimes expanded
and elaborated in accordance with these patterns. This change is not just observed behav-
iorally, but we can follow the neural correlates of the representations as they change, and
make interventions to predictably effect the outcome of this process. These changes are at
odds with the tagging and constructive hypotheses, and thus in tension with preservation
and constructivism.
2.3 Two Retrieval Systems
What does it mean to structure information according to patterns? In this section, I’ll
discuss what two conceptual views of memory that capture the kind of information changes
observed during sleep: model systems and index systems. For each, I’ll define it, relate it
to the retrieval norm, and then give some examples of that system in the world.
5Buzsaki and Moser suggest that the semantic/episodic divide might be grounded evolutionarily in the
allocentric/egocentric distinction in spatial navigation [18]. If this is right, since spatial representations are
quite obviously model-like, there’s a good reason to think the memory system which evolved from them
shares this property. See [28] for evidence that spatial representations are relational.
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2.3.1 The Model System
A model system is any information processing system that builds, evaluates, and other-
wise processes models. This isn’t very helpful - the real question is what is a model?
Informally, I’ll take models to be representations that work via mapping dimensions of
the system being represented (which I’ll call the object) onto dimensions of the represen-
tational domain (which I’ll call the medium). These dimensions can’t just be points; what
differentiates a model from, say, a group of sentences or a table of facts is that it encodes
not just the current state of the object, but also regularities, laws or expectations about how
features of the object might change (i.e. dynamics). So for instance, a plastic model of an
atom counts as a model because the way that the plastic beads move around on the rings
encodes dynamics of the movement of electrons across the levels. Now, note that some
features and dimensions of the plastic atom model don’t encode anything about atoms; the
fact that the rings are painted in colors from blue to red, for instance, says nothing about
any property of atoms. So a second property of models is that they are simplified: they
function to encode only some of the total features of the object. And further, the model
atom represents the dynamics of the electrons via the relationship between its plastic parts
- the final property which I’ll ascribe to models is that they are relational. If we had a model
of the atom and a plastic model of a zoo sitting next to one another, their union does not
form a new model. And likewise, within the model atom, were we to separate the various
parts based on which particle they represent, this breaking down of the model would result
in information loss. This is what makes the atom model a model, but the union of atom and
zoo models not a model.
One caveat: I’m not trying to give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the common-
sense category of models. Instead, I’m just presenting criteria for being a certain kind of
model that will then explain why models are suited to the retrieval task.
As a class, models are representations which have these properties:
domain-specific: the representation employs structures or uses a medium which
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is suitable specifically for the kind of thing it is used to represent, as opposed
to being generically suitable for representing anything.
relational: all ways of dividing the representation into an unordered set of
local representations will result in a loss of information. This is because some
information adheres in the relations between parts of the representation, and so
is lost when we separate it into parts.
simplified: the representation has fewer dimensions than there are in the infor-
mation representable about the set of objects it depicts. (Here dimensionality
is understood in the information-theoretic sense to mean a feature space: for
each feature or aspect of the data, we add one dimension to the model.)
What is the difference between a model and a network? In the case of a relational
database, for instance, we talk about networks having some of the features I’ve ascribed
to models. I take the difference to be that models are manners of representing, whereas
networks are ways of implementing or storing representations.
Chalmers [22] describes manners of representing as the impure content, where the
propositional content that the cat is on the table can be represented in a visual manner,
or a conceptual manner and so on. He describes these manners as occurring at a variety of
levels of descriptions, such that one representation will usually be characterized by several
manners of representation.
This does not that manners of representation are informationally neutral, that is, they
sometimes constrain the content in a context. Imagine we have an auditory and visual rep-
resentation which have as their content the same set of propositions about the cat on the
table. Now, if we add the proposition that the table is on top of the rug, the two represen-
tations may update in divergent ways, adding different entailments to their content. For
instance, in the visual representation, it will surely follow that the cat is above the rug. This
might not be part of the content in the auditory representation. So while different manners
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of representing can have the same content, they won’t in general have the same dynam-
ics, or changes in content. Ways of implementing representations, in contrast, are usually
informationally neutral.6
So the claim that models are ways or manners of representing entails saying that models
encode dynamic inference patterns. When the same static content is represented in two
different maps, the total content in each case will tend to change in divergent ways when
updating on the same evidence.
Putting all this together, what it means to say that memory systems are model systems
is that they employ simplified representations with a domain-specific functional architec-
ture. How many of these representation structures there are and how they fit together will
depend on the agent or system in question, but the common thread which I’ll now argue
for depends on the aforementioned characteristics of models along with the idea of using
multiple representations in parallel.
Now that we have a working theory of a model system, we can ask: why single out
this system as a solution to the retrieval problem? Here’s the idea: in order to be effective
under conditions (a)-(c), retrieval systems need to be able to deal with an influx of new in-
formation that bears on previously learned information. To do so, they need to be dynamic
- capable of using this new information to update and change the current representations.
Second, the system needs to be able to extend current information to new cases - some
queries will require extrapolation or interpolation, rather than just reading off what is al-
ready recorded. I’ll call this ability to extend to new cases prediction, though it need not
be about the future. Third, the representations in the system need to be searchable. These
are meant to be central attributes of successful retrieval systems, but not exhaustive.
The relational features of model systems allow for dynamics, since isomorphic ranges
essentially encode a series of behaviors, and given that the medium itself is bound by rules
6Of course, just like any feature of the implementation of some content, it can constrain the content; the
machine might not be big enough for some degree of information, for instance. But in general, two identical
representations can be stored in totally different ways without this effecting their dynamics.
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(say, spatial rules), the rules on the medium will generate rules for the representation. For
instance, take a model of an argument in an a conceptual map on a spatial medium. The
isomorphism here is between conceptual nearness and (Euclidean) spatial contiguity. So it
follows that the conceptual nearness, according to our model, will always be symmetric.
Intending to represent the concept of ‘art’ as closer to the concept of ‘dreams’ will result
in the symmetric revision that ‘dreams’ will be closer to ‘art’, and most likely many more
changes.
The simplified nature of models enhances prediction. This is because simplicity is
known to increase predictive power by pushing the model away from overfitting. Here’s
Hitchcock and Sober on this point: “For the complex model to have the higher estimated
predictive accuracy, it isn’t enough that it merely fit the data better than its simpler com-
petitors (that’s pretty much inevitable); it must fit the data sufficiently better to compensate
for the loss in simplicity it represents” [47]. And it’s easy to see why simplicity enhances
search.
Finally, the domain-specific nature of models supports each of the characteristics. Domain-
specific representations can encode more regularities, since many regularities hold only
within domains and not in general.
The reason to have multiple overlapping models can be derived from the second part
of the environmental condition - that the agent expects to get a lot more information in the
future. With more and more information, the models the agent currently has might become
quickly inaccurate. One reason to have multiple models is to be risk-averse. Part of the
distinctive role of memory is to provide a database of facts that can be re-purposed even
if the agent’s fundamental assumptions and beliefs have changed. Multiple overlapping
representations help fulfill this role by allowing the agent to have a range of representations
with different dynamics. Episodic memory, for instance, seems like it’s slower to change
than semantic memory; this fact may account for why folk psychology seems not to treat
episodic memories as completely static. So this allows the agent to use episodic memory
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as a source of recovery if their semantic memory needs to be radically revised - this means
the model system retains prediction, dynamics and effective search in cases of recovery or
goal drift.
Overlapping representations allow the agent to use multiple functions; for instance, if
I’m having trouble remembering in general what kinds of things people give as house-
warming gifts (a semantic task), I can switch to episodic retrieval and think up examples of
things people have given me as housewarming gifts. This is particularly true if the search
functions have exponential cost and are reasonably independent; in that case, adding a new
function will massively increase the likelihood of retrieval. In addition, different manners
of representation allow for sequential versus random access retrieval, so the agent can use
a flexible retrieval strategy which exploits the advantages of both methods.
2.3.2 The Index System
In the model system, the entirety of stored information is transformed and used in mod-
els. The index system, on the contrary, keeps the underlying information in unstructured
form, while using a dynamic index to alter what is retrieved over time. As I’ll discuss in
Section 2.4, these two systems exist on a continuum. While I haven’t found anyone directly
defending the index system as a model of memory in the philosophical literature, I think it
captures an intuitive idea: why can’t we just work with unstructured stored data by means
of a very intelligent search system? I’ll build this thought into a competitor for the model
system in this section.
An index system has two representational components: a (mostly) unstructured dataset,
and an index. Processing in this system involves constantly updating the index, and retriev-
ing items from the dataset via the index. Essentially, the index functions as an intermediary
between the query and the dataset. The index itself can be relatively simple, or very com-
plicated, consisting in multiple ways of retrieving the data and highly structured clusters or
properties.
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While an index in the back of a book is usually an alphabetical list of terms with a link
to a page number in the text, indexes for more complex retrieval systems tend to be inverted.
This means that instead of a list of terms, we have a list of documents. Each document has
a set of entries associated with its content. Unlike a table of contents or index in the back
of a book, an inverted index represents the documents through their contents rather than
representing some content through its location in documents.
A simple method for indexing is to represent documents as vectors, where each cell
records the place of the term in the string. For instance, the sentence “I should store this
now” can be represented like this: ID should could store this now I
1 2 0 3 4 5 1

In this case, I recorded all of the data in the string, but often, I only want to index
some of the data: for instance, I could index all of the titles of articles in a news archive7.
Typically, because even an index this light can become expensive, we would try to reduce
the dimensionality in various lossy or lossless ways depending on the application 8. Then,
I could use the simple representation above to look for articles that use the phrase “should
store” by looking for numerals n, n + 1 in the second and fourth columns. For every time
that pattern appeared, I would use the entry in the first column to bring up the document
containing that term in the headline.
This kind of system is widely used in web search. I’ll focus on index systems for web
search over natural language data; similar systems are used for searching and indexing
images, but natural language data is complicated enough to see the features of indexing
that are important for my purposes.
Essentially, all web search operates via indexing; users put data on the web in formats
that range from semi-structured (such as a wikipedia entry) to unstructured (such as an
7data structures such as tries [39] that store the entire dataset are sometime classified along with indexes,
but for my purposes an index must be an intermediary between the query and a further dataset.
8for instance, using singular vector decomposition (SVD)
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image), and search engines crawl through that content and index it. Cutting edge indexing
procedures for engines like Google involve combinations of hand-coding, intelligent use of
user input, machine learning and so on. User input can take the form of explicit feedback
but more often involves things like taking the fact that they went several pages into the
results before clicking as a failure (see [56] and [50] for recent work on making the ranking
process more intelligent).
The index part of the index system shares some of the features of a model system, even
though the underlying unstructured data is different. The index is usually simplified - unlike
the index used above, all of the information in a document is almost never represented.
Indices are often relational - an easy way to compress an index is to omit strings shared
by all documents, which has the result that the representation of any particular document
is determined in part by what other documents are being stored. However, most indices
are not domain specific. For instance, an index used for web search handles all kinds of
natural language information. In part, this must reflect the practical use we put indices to.
However, a genuine difference with models is that an index can be highly content neutral,
such as the example above, or very content specific.
2.4 Comparing the Index and Model Systems
How does the index system solve the retrieval problem? It updates the index frequently
and intelligently, in a way that involves not only adding entries, but changing up the struc-
ture. This allows for effective search by keeping the index sufficiently simple and making
sure it represents or draws on relevant features of the data. For example, the index to a
database of news articles should probably encode (among other things) dates of those ar-
ticles. But even better would be an index that had a hierarchical structure, for instance,
it could embed an index that separated articles by sentiment under one that characterized
them as movie reviews or sports articles. As it turns out, many indexes are organized this
way - not unlike tags and sub-tags on a calendar app.
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The step I made in the last couple sentences of the proceeding paragraph is a blueprint
for the argument of this section. As we ask indexes to do more and more difficult tasks,
and grant that they have the necessary computational capacities, an index system as a whole
starts to function more and more like a model system.
What makes web search different from human memory? One difference is that while
the data in web search is added by users who all have different goals, in our memory
systems, the same agent adds data and categorizes it. Even if you take a very modular
approach to the mind, there is still both a set of interests that characterize the agent as a
whole, and a good deal of calibration between cognitive faculties - even if this calibration
is unsupervised and unconscious. In web search, content is often added in an adversarial
way. For instance, most companies who have web pages want them to appear as high on
the ranking for any search query as possible, whereas the search engine wants only results
that are relevant to users (or at least, that users will click on).
This difference explains why web search must use indexes: the task of structuring the
data itself, rather than superimposing an index with structure, is much harder than for a
human brain with a cooperative and calibrated input system. But even in current search
engines, you can see the switch from one system to another. Think about how many times
you put in a search query and found your answer just by looking at the page, without
clicking on any of the retrieved items. This is a case where the function of retrieval is being
satisfied just by the index representation, instead of the index acting as an intermediary.
How can the index itself fulfill this function? By being representational, relational, simple,
and so on.
An interesting case here is the use of features of the data, rather than the data itself,
to answer queries. Xia et al[96] present a model on which the mean and variance of the
data is used to update the index instead of the values in the data itself. This is meant for
cases with lots of fluctuations in the data around a fairly stable mean; the computational
challenges of indexing on-line around this kind of data are significant, so using this higher
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order feature instead decreases costs. For instance, location-based services like smartphone
navigation involve constant influx of data - Xia et al’s system uses the mean and variance
of this information for updating the index. Essentially, the index is working like a model.
So I think there’s reason to believe that as we relax the computational limitation on an
index system like web search, and allow it the power to incorporate more of the content into
the index in a hierarchical format, queries and other user demands will be satisfied more
and more by the index itself. This can happen even without relaxation, as the Xia et al. case
shows - there we just adjusted the relative complexity of the various computational stages.
Of course, I’m not suggesting that it’s optimal to discard the data. I would agree with most
epistemologists that one should never give up information if it doesn’t cost you anything.
But the data will become less and less relevant to the day-to-day operations of the system.
Thus, functionally speaking, as we approach negligible computational limitations, the in-
dex system will function just like the model system. If you’re not particularly interested in
the ideal agent, it’s also worth noting that the relevant limitations in the connection between
data and its analysis are not particularly applicable in the case of memory in a biological
organism.
On a more empirical note, the mammalian memory systems described in Section 2.2
resemble a model system more closely than an index system. One relevant finding is con-
fabulation. The increase in confabulation following sleep, such as the memory that I saw
‘EFG’ when in fact I saw a set of other alphabetical strings in the same pattern, is not ac-
commodated well by the index view. As I’ve noted, generalization and gist extract during
sleep leads to the creation of new, confabulated memory entries. Confabulated memory
entries are at least sometimes produced by the memory system. If memory is an index sys-
tem, the index is not responsible for generating content. So on the index view, sleep-linked
confabulation must either be explained away, or a new mechanism posited to explain the
addition of content to the index and the storage system respectively. On the contrary, on
the model view, the confabulation results are expected as a consequence of simplification.
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For instance, a natural simplification of the sets of letters is something like ‘I saw a bunch
of strings of 3 consecutive letters’ - and of course, the confabulated string fits just as well
under this heading.
2.5 Epistemological Context
Here I’ll survey some views on memory in the epistemology literature that contrast with
the model view. I’ll assume the framing of the retrieval problem, and the environmental
conditions (a)-(c), and argue that these other options fail under those assumptions to give a
satisfactory account of the contribution of memory to knowledge.
2.5.1 Causal Theories
The first class of extant views are causal and preservationist theories. While they have
key differences, all these views subscribe to the following:
Origination Principle: For every memory with content p, there is a unique
original mental act with content p∗ to which that memory can be linked (which
forms the grounds for identifying its justification and/or content).
This will be the target of my arguments, but first I’ll discuss the views themselves.
For Bernecker, who starts with a conceptual analysis of the individual states of memory,
memories are mental representations which share a continuous internal causal connection
with a sequence of states of the same content, tracing back to a single incident of perception
or some other kind of doxastic act. In the latter case, for instance, my memory of the
concluding step of a theorem will relate back to my realization of that step. In general, the
original incident will be a case of coming to know, coming to believe, or coming to acquire
the information which I’ll call the content of that incident. When the original incident is
a propositional attitude, the content is simply the content of that attitude; if the incident
is non-propositional, which will be the case under some views of perception, the content
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is something like the proposition that corresponds to the non-propositional content. For
the sake of simplicity, I’ll focus on the case where the original incident is a propositional
attitude.
It’s this original incident that gives the memory its content: “memory contents are fixed
by the past environments and remain unchanged until some later moment of recollection”
(169) [11]. On Bernecker’s view, when I’m slow-switched from Earth to twin-Earth, my
memories with the content ‘water’ will refer to water if the original incident was pre-switch,
and twin water if it was after the switch. This view falls under a more general class of
causal views, where what makes some state a memory depends on a causal connection
between that state and the other states which make up the memory trace. Causal theorists
are not all committed to sameness of content among the states in the trace; Bernecker allows
for entailments of the original content to be added to the later content, for instance, and
Michaelian (in earlier work, before rejecting this view to turn to constructivism [64] [63])
allows for change and reconstruction so long as there’s a “sufficient” degree of similarity
between all the contents in the trace. But in either case, these views all clearly presuppose
the Origination Principle.
Causal views of memory have a few advantages. I take it that they’re quite intuitive,
and express something like our common-sense notion that memories are preserved contents
from the past. Causal views also allow for a neat and simple treatment of memory content;
since each memory can be traced back to an initiating epistemic act (for instance, my
memory of seeing an apple traces to the act of me seeing the apple), it simply inherits the
content of that act. Thus, memories refer to the past and restrictions on perception, imagi-
nation or other doxastic states which might be initiating events carry forward to restrictions
on memory. If I’m not in the position to form beliefs about the paradoxical circle-square,
for instance, I won’t be able to remember anything about it either9.
9John Campbell[20] offers an alternative to the causal view. He argues that since many memories can’t
be traced back to an initiating event, it’s more plausible that memories are about possible past instances than
actual ones. For instance, when I remember my grandfather’s gas station, it seems implausible that this entails
that I’m remembering a single instance of being at the gas station. Instead, I could have taken elements from
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These causal views are a natural fit with a position about the function of memory:
preservationism. As presented in Burge [17], an agent is entitled (or prima facie justified)
in holding a remembered belief if the belief represented in the memory was originally
justified. More generally, if the original incident was of epistemic value (if it was a case
of knowledge, justification, responsibleness etc), memory functions to preserve that status.
One could extend this view to infer a norm for the memory system, in the following way.
First, epistemically well-functioning memory preserves justification. Since justification is
inherited from the original belief formation, memory ought to hold on to beliefs in as close
to the original condition as possible. It’s up to the belief formation and revision system, in
other words, to come up with justified beliefs, and the memory system has the more passive
role of preserving that justification.
In response to objections that preservationism is a bad fit with psychological evidence,
Michaelian proposes a weakening of the thesis on which “for any finite cognizer, a cer-
tain pattern of forgetting is necessary if her memory is to perform its function well... by
eliminating “clutter” from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves the overall
shape of the subject’s total doxastic state” ([63], 399). On his picture, the ideal agent would
preserve all of their memories, but for agents with limited capacities for storage, the norm
is to store up to the point when storage inhibits retrieval: “Even where the subject actively
updates her beliefs, the record that underwrote an outdated belief can continue to lower the
reliability of retrieval” (412).
In summary, the views outlined above are in agreement about several points. First, they
define the content of memory or the norms governing memory by reference to a single
original incident which is not itself a memory. This requires the Origination Principle. For
Burge, this original incident is the original belief (or perceptual belief etc.) which is either
many visits and compiled them into a single representation. Campbell proposes that this representation be
treated as a representation of a possible way the gas station could have looked to me. This account avoids the
objection to the causal theory that our memories rarely seem to meet causal criteria, but it’s vulnerable to an
objection about the accuracy of memories. What does it mean to truthfully depict a possible past incident?
I’ll set Campbell’s view aside for now since I can imagine extensions of it that would be consistent with my
conclusions, and others that wouldn’t be.
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justified or not. For causal theorists like Bernecker and Michaelian, it’s the incident which
fixes the content of the belief. It’s natural, but not strictly logically necessary, for these
incidents to be the same. A second similarity is that memory is conservative in nature,
functioning to maintain or sometimes repair content or justification; while some of these
views allow for changes in content, these changes are restricted by the original incident
and there is no positive norm provided for memory change. Note that this conservatism
depends on the first: without a fixed idea of the original thing, there’s nothing to conserve.
My first objection to the origination principle is just that it’s unmotivated - what’s so
special about the original content? A reply might be that we have direct contact with the
original contents, or they have a greater degree of justification. There might need to be a
system to maintain inferences off of these core contents, but that wouldn’t be the job of the
memory system.
Note that because original incidents can be perceptions, realizations, emotions and all
kinds of other mental acts, there will need to be a privileged content in every case - and
to avoid a heterogenous and disjointed system, these contents will have to either be the
same or easily translatable between each category. If we look closely at what makes up
a remembered episode, I doubt that there will be a natural unit which forms the secure
content; instead, while some of the information will be more or less noisy, there won’t be a
difference in kind. And in fact, sometimes we might use many memories in the origination-
principle sense to generate a extrapolated content of which we are more certain than any
of the memories. I’ve argued throughout this paper that we should expect this to be part
of ideal memory functioning - for the system itself to generate new content via abstraction,
simplification and so on - and yet this content would not count as remembered given the
origination principle. Here, Michaelian[63] would object that causal views can still account
for some content change and addition. But this is only in non-ideal agents.
Overall, the issue with the origination principle is that it imposes a means of individuat-
ing content on the memory system. On the contrary, the considerations I’ve offered support
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an epistemic advantage for the memory system itself being responsible for building and
changing representations. Memory faces different challenges than other systems, and has
unique data needs. Even if these new structures can be described in terms of inherited
content, as Michaelian wishes to do, doing so adds nothing to the epistemological theory.
Insofar as epistemology and theories of content should go together, origination theories
can’t work.
2.5.2 Memory-as-Testimony
This section is concerned with a view that doesn’t rely at all on the origination principle.
In contrast, it treats the epistemic value of content supplied by memory as equivalent to
testimony. Given the wide variety of views on testimony, this theory of memory could
work in a wide variety of ways. For simplicity, I’ll assume the following view of testimony,
which Barnett [7] calls the naive view: “when a source of testimony tells you that p, what
you learn first is not p itself but instead merely the fact that the source says that p”. Barnett
goes on to qualify that this is an internalist view in that it depends on your justification
in believing that your source is reliable, rather than the source actually being reliable, but
I’ll stay neutral on this point and allow either version to count as the memory-as-testimony
view.
One relevant issue for the testimony view is that the retrieval problem that I’ve argued is
central to memory is outside of the normative scope of the view. Why? Because, just like in
the case of ordinary testimony, when we are asking the up-taker of the testimony to justify
her reliance on it, this view is about how and when the rememberer is justified in relying
on the information served up by her memory system. The retrieval problem is about how to
store and modify information in order to offer the correct entries up in response to a query;
that is, in the analogy, good retrieval is like being a good testifier, not a good up-taker of
testimony.
Of course, it’s coherent to ask what a good testifier looks like. I’d like to note here that
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answering this question is not part of the analysis offered by extant memory-as-testimony
accounts. More problematically, it’s the focus of almost none of the testimony literature
itself. And in fact, this may be because epistemology should be relatively permissive about
what constitutes a good testifier. It doesn’t seem irrational for me not to fully optimize
my communication to serve your epistemic goals, let alone to prepare my storage systems
for years in advance in order to offer up information which will be both accurate and also
relevant to your needs. Even if this would be excellent social behavior, it seems excessive
to suggest that it would be rationally required. And yet, this is exactly what we would have
to do to maintain both the testimony analogy and the importance of the retrieval problem.
In conclusion, I have not argued that there is no useful analogy between memory and testi-
mony, but merely that the epistemic analogy between memory and testimony seems unable
to explain anything about how to solve the retrieval problem.
2.6 Wrong Level of Abstraction?
You might think everything I’ve been saying is sort of reasonable for structuring a
machine, but not of normative importance. How could something as low-level as manners
of representation within the memory system bear on epistemic rationality?
In response, I emphasize that it’s not the details of the model system doing the nor-
mative work; the details are meant to show how optimizing for one task that looks fairly
passive - i.e. retrieval - leads directly to active and generative procedures. That is, the
model view of memory says that just by caring about retrieving relevant and accurate in-
formation, we end up with a memory system that functions not like a file-box, but like
an off-line deliberation system. It moves information around, builds theories, puts things
together, and fills in the gaps. The key result isn’t how the various stages work, but the
fairly abstract fact that achieving the central epistemic goal of memory involves making
new content. In a sense, the algorithmic level is just here to demonstrate the relationship
between retrieval and active generation. This is where it’s especially key that the model
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system isn’t a system for storing models, but a system for making them.
Put another way, if you are interested in the question of how we are justified in main-
taining beliefs over time, you might think that the information-transforming aspects of
memory are not relevant to answering this question. While it might be adaptive to come
up with new information in memory, it need not effect my justification in believing based
on memory in the ‘normal’ case where the memory is not significantly altered. But I hope
to have shown that this analysis which abstracts away from the messy cases is misguided.
This approach misses the commonality between the ‘normal’ case where a memory resem-
bles a past belief closely, and other cases where the memory is accurate but has drifted
significantly from sharing a content with any past belief. That is, both cases are the product
of computations that enabled those contents to be retrieved, and both reflect background
beliefs and values of the agent. Since computations like modeling are the sorts of things
we are used to evaluating for rationality and justification, it should be at least an open ques-
tion whether the etiology behind memory retrieval, even of ‘normal’, seemingly-unaltered
content, is relevant to determining the justification of memorial beliefs.
2.7 Conclusion
A feature of the model system is that it has a significant tendency towards incoherence;
since we’re building different kinds of models that idealize away from different features
on the same data (i.e. they are overlapping), we should expect some of the extensions and
extrapolations to contradict one another. Oddly enough, this shows a strength of the model
view. That is, allowing memory to itself build and change models gives us a theory on
which those changes are necessarily off-line (very off-line, in the case of human memory
changes during REM sleep). Incoherence has worried a lot of philosophers, but the model
view gives us a case of incoherence strictly speaking, but stripped of its most problematic
features. This type of incoherence is between models, rather than within a model, and is
processed at a distance from resultant actions (i.e. it’s off-line).
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A second consequence worth pointing out is that I’ve talked a lot about how the model
system works, but my proposed change to the internal workings of memory also would
lead to changes in the external role of memory, by which I mean the way other parts of our
cognitive faculties are hooked up to memory. A rough way of characterizing this second
shift is to think of how we use a set of facts from a filebox versus how we use a model.
Where the former gets inputted and digested, the latter acts more like a guide.
In summary, in this paper, I emphasized the centrality of retrieval to memory, and situ-
ated the memory problem in a series of environmental conditions (a)-(c). From this starting
point, I considered how memory changes during sleep give us a reason to look for an alter-
native epistemology of memory that explains why patterns and generalizations over stored
information are enhanced and sometimes learned in sleep. It is these structures that ex-
plain the more commonly cited cases of constructive memory. I then presented two kinds
of system that solve the retrieval problem in part by structuring and generalizing. My
preferred option, the model system, makes, updates and maintains a series of overlapping
representations that are simplified, domain-specific and relational. I argued that for realis-
tic human creatures as well as ideal, non-limited agents, the model system works the best,
and the alternative index system, succeeds insofar as it starts to resemble the model sys-
tem. In the final sections, I contrasted this essentially productive memory system to the
systems implied by two families of theories in the epistemology of memory. This might
have convinced you that these other theories need some work, but I was mainly hoping to
demonstrate that adopting the model view will result in non-trivial changes to the epistemic
role of memory.
I’ll leave the reader with this thought: philosophers have long studied on-line, delib-
erative changes in belief. But it’s evident that many significant changes happen off-line,
whether transitions from believing P to believing ¬P , or realizing that Q is also a possi-
bility, or so on. I suspect that looking closer at the how information changes in memory
systems and understanding what makes a successful or unsuccessful change will be a sig-
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ABSTRACT. Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valu-
able outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exem-
plify what is called the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In computer science and statis-
tics, this trade-off has fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make
choices over time. In this paper, I argue that the trade-off also extends to belief. We can be
torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate, whereas
the other looks like it will lead to more learning opportunity. Further, it is sometimes ratio-
nally permissible to choose the latter. I break down the features of action which lead to the
trade-off, and then argue for each that it applies equally well to belief. This conclusion is an
instance of a systematic, foreseeable way in which what is rational to believe now depends
on what one expects to be doing in the future. That is, epistemic rationality fundamentally
concerns time.
Introduction
In many decision-making scenarios, we can observe a trade-off between choosing the
action that maximizes expected reward, or the action most likely to result in learning some-
thing new: the exploration/exploitation trade-off. For instance, imagine you are choosing
between ordering your favorite ice cream flavor or trying a new one. Exploiting consists
in picking the option most likely, on your evidence, to have the highest value. Exploring,
on the other hand, involves choosing something previously untested or about which you’re
uncertain. There’s a trade-off because the best behavior for exploring (say, trying every
flavor once, even banana-tomato) is rarely the behavior that is the most likely to maximize
35
reward - and vice versa. The striking result, in the case of action, is that these exploratory
behaviors that look like seeking out information are rationalized entirely without appealing
to the agent valuing information; even if I only love tastiness, I should still sometimes try
flavors that seem likely to be disgusting. The task of this paper is to extend the idea of
such a trade-off to the case of belief formation and change: should we ever believe solely
in order to explore?
Initially, the prospect of a symmetry between exploration in action and exploration in
belief might look unlikely. For one, actions are chosen voluntarily, whereas beliefs are
formed automatically, without deliberation or an act of the will (see [5] for a discussion
of this question). So the exploration/exploitation trade-off might be a decision-theoretic
concept that is out of place in the context of belief. Likewise, we usually think of epistemic
rationality as universal and unchanging, whereas rational decision-making allows for trade-
offs and merely instrumental rational actions.
However, I will argue that there is indeed an exploration/exploitation trade-off in be-
lief, because of the connection between our current beliefs and our dispositions to conduct
experiments and explore the space of possibilities. This paper is the first to posit explo-
ration in belief. However, others have argued for exploration in other parts of cognition,
for instace Sripada[85] argues for exploration in the act of imagination. While past work
on epistemic trade-offs in belief has focused on situationally-driven trade-offs that are ar-
bitrary and often fantastical[43], this paper looks at a learning situation that characterizes
most of our epistemic positions in real life, and posits a systematic and easily implemented
rule: deviate occasionally from the recommendations of your best policy (i.e. the first-order
plan composed of myopically exploitative acts) in the beginning of inquiry.
I concentrate on the beginning of inquiry only because this is a relatively simple and
clear application of the trade-off - indeed, at all stages of inquiry and when the stage is
indeterminate, other factors such as relative payoffs modulate the trade-off. The beginning
of inquiry is determined by how long the inquiry will extend into the future as compared
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to how long it has progressed so far, and how much more evidence will be acquired as
compared to how much evidence has already been collected, among other things. These
features are relational; two agents may have exactly the same evidence about some issue,
but if one expects to get more evidence in the future than the other, they may be in different
stages of inquiry. This is significant because epistemologists have long assumed (whether
implicitly or explicitly) that considerations about what the agent will be doing in the fu-
ture, and how long they’ll have to do it, are irrelevant to epistemic rationality. Consider, for
instance, how unlikely it is for a typical case in the literature on peer disagreement to men-
tion what further evidence might be available after the current episode. Along similar lines,
convergence arguments (like the one debated in [9] and [48]) ground rational procedures
by appealing to the limiting case of infinite evidence. Consequently, one of the goals of
this paper is to propose that we attend more seriously to facts about the agent’s evidential
position over time.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 3.1, I survey the formal literature
on the exploration/exploitation trade-off in action and identify some structural features of
decision problems which give rise to the trade-off. In Section 3.2, I introduce an example
of belief which I’ll use to demonstrate what exploration in belief might look like. I then ar-
gue that each feature which generates the trade-off in action holds for belief in Section 3.3.
The core argument, in Section 3.5.2, appeals to how belief rationally guides and constrains
imagination. Section 3.7 discusses objections and the significance of this project and an-
alyzes its relation to other questions in epistemology including doxastic voluntarism and
epistemic consequentialism.
3.1 The Exploration/Exploitation Trade-Off
I’ll now explain the trade-off through a simplified version of a classic setup in the
literature: the multi-armed bandit. I’ll start with a brief discussion of the significance of
the trade-off. Readers familiar with the trade-off can skip to Section 3.1.3.
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3.1.1 Prelude
The ice-cream shop example I’ve just described illustrates how wanting to get the tasti-
est treat now and wanting to get information so as to pick the tastiest treat next time are
often at odds with one another. This result is significant, because it contradicts a common-
sense maxim of decision-making: to do as well as possible at getting good results, pick the
options that are most likely to lead to good results. Instead, this trade-off shows that, pre-
dictably, occasionally choosing options that don’t look so good will lead to a better overall
outcome1
What does this mean for decision theory? Contrast the exploration-exploitation trade-
off to Good’s theorem[41], the principle that an expected-utility maximizer will never turn
down free information. Good’s theorem takes a framework for rational action, Savage’s
decision theory, and shows that optimal agents in this framework always make a certain
kind of choice. That is, Good noted that maximizing expected utility entails seeking out
free information before acting. On the other hand, the exploration-exploitation trade-off
shows that agents who chose only to maximize exploitation will tend to get in trouble in
many environments: it’s is an observation about actual utility. The agent who only exploits
expects her choices to maximize utility, but we know that they likely won’t. And note that
the trade-off shows that exploitation doesn’t pay off across a set of environments that we
can specify in advance and which the agent can identify from the inside. You didn’t need
to know anything hidden about the ice-cream example to see that it makes sense to try a
new flavor. Further, as I’ll expand on later, the trade-off is also modulated by observable
features of the environment; it’s better to explore more earlier, and when pay-offs are lower,
and exploit more later, and when pay-offs are higher.
So where Good’s theorem describes how expected-utility maximers will act, the exploration-
exploitation trade-off raises a challenge for the expected-utility maximizer: how can an
1see [49] for a formal proof that an agent with a little randomness built in almost always outperforms one
that uses a more standard algorithm for approximating rational choice).
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agent who always chooses the act that looks best avoid the pitfalls of exploitation? The
predictability of the failures of pure exploitation mean that our ideal agent should know
better. As I discuss in Section 3.1.3, one possible solution is to maintain that the perfect
agent always does know better, and so never has to deviate from the plan. However, this
does not make any progress on answering the challenge for the less than perfect agent. The
difficulty, and the interest, in understanding the exploration-exploitation trade-off in action
is this point: if you know that occasionally deviating from your best plan will get you the
best results, does that make these moments of essentially random deviation rational? And
what does this imply about what it means to be rational?
3.1.2 The Multi-Armed Bandit
In this example, I show that as a rule, in order to receive the optimal reward from many
environments, a (somewhat limited) agent should occasionally choose actions not recom-
mended by her best policy. By as a rule, I mean that this result predictably applies to many
environments, and that one could reasonably believe that choosing a non-recommended
action would help based on limited information. Optimal reward will be measured by ag-
gregate preference satisfaction, which in this toy example will be total number of dollars
won. This section serves two functions: (a) it explicates the exploration/exploitation trade-
off for action, and (b) it establishes that some behaviors that seem to reflect a preference for
information are rationalizable for agents who do not intrinsically value information. That
is, if exploring non-recommended options is predictably associated with optimal reward,
then rational agents will carry out these behaviors regardless of what they take to be optimal
reward.
Now, some setup. Let’s assume a simple expected utility (EU) framework. We have
some agent, who has probabilities over various outcomes and multiplies these with the cor-
responding utilities to generate expected utilities. Canonically, these outcomes are com-
plete states of the world. However, in practice, we often idealize away from these complex
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states into simpler ones, and evaluate only the value of the immediate result of each action.
For now, our expected utility framework will be near-sighted or myopic in this way.
Now here’s the problem our agent faces. She can choose to play at one of three slot
machine arms i − k. After each play, she may continue at the same arm, or switch to a
different arm - in other words, this is a sequential choice problem. Each arm produces
stochastic rewards distributed around a fixed unknown bias 2. Let’s say she starts with the
following estimations of the biases, where a higher bias means a higher probability of a
valuable outcome: bi = .5, bj = .2, bk = .1. Now, assuming that she’s going to play these
slot machines for some significant amount of time, what should she do?
One method would be to always choose the arm with highest expected reward, cal-
culated from the estimated bias and her confidence in that estimate. She would start by
choosing arm i. After she plays i, she’ll get some information. Let’s say that the true bias
of i is .8, and the outcomes in the short term reflect that bias fairly faithfully. So by us-
ing this method, she will continue to choose i over and over again, because its estimated
payout will never drop below that of arm j, which has the next highest estimate. This is
the method recommended by her myopic expected utility rule; I’ll call it the myopic ex-
ploitation method. It’s exploitative because it always does what is best according to current
expectations - where A is the act which maximizes expected utility, myopic exploitation
always requires her to do A.
How good is the myopic exploitation method? Only as good as our agent’s expectations.
If she’s right initially that i is the best arm, she’ll attain the optimal reward. However,
if she’s wrong, and for instance k actually has a bias of .9, her total reward will not be
optimal, and indeed will be significantly suboptimal as the choice is repeated over and
over. She has no reason to try the other arms if she only acts to maximize reward at the next
step. Myopic exploitation has a significant risk of getting her stuck in a local maximum, a
section of the reward landscape that is better than all neighboring possibilities but not the
2Multi-armed bandit problems tend to have looser assumptions around bias, for instance that the reward

















Figure 3.1: A simple bandit problem, where arms have a bias drawn from an underlying distribu-
tion and fixed noise
best overall. Once she’s in the bandit situation described above, she’ll never stop making
the same suboptimal choice.
A very simple way of allowing for exploration in an exploitative decision strategy
(where A is the act with highest exploitative value) is to add this rule: at every decision
point, choose a random act other than A with probability , choose A with probability
1− . This is called an -greedy strategy. Here, as we increase , our agent explores more
and more, and correspondingly, any decrease in  will lead to an increase in exploitation.
As  approaches 1, our agent will learn a lot by choosing all the options equally, but her
learning will not benefit her, since her knowledge about the options won’t affect her be-
havior at all. As  approaches 0, her behavior will converge to the myopic exploitation
rule - she’ll always maximize, and never veer off course. Because she will learn more and
more about her environment as she makes these choices, it’s reasonable for her to start off
exploring a lot and then exploit more and more as information accumulates - when she
knows everything about the outcomes, there’s no need to try new things, whereas when her
expectations are poorly informed, maximizing expected utility is unlikely to be particularly
effective.
For instance, in the multi-armed bandit case sketched above, an -greedy strategy with
a sufficiently large  will cause our agent to occasionally sample the arms other than i. As
she does so, her confidence will rise that arm k is actually better. As we lower , she’ll only
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choose k, which is the optimal strategy.
As it happens, -greedy methods approximate optimal solutions to the multi-armed
bandit problems in many contexts. The extant optimal solutions involve calculating the
Gittens index of each arm, which is roughly the value that we place on continuing to use
that arm adjusting for the potential of learning. This approach splits the high-dimensional
optimization problem into a series of smaller problems: calculating the relative values of
trying each arm once at each state. 3
As I’ve described, the exploration/exploitation trade-off is typically formally specified
in the context of the multi-armed bandit problem. However, it is used far more widely to
describe a trade-off in decision-making, for instance in clinical trials[70] and to describe
foraging behavior in birds[54]. The common element in all of these applications is that
the agents face a series of choices that predictably, but with uncertainty, produce both
rewards and evidence. Further, there is a systematic link between some actions (foraging
at a new patch of ground, giving a patient a medication) and some evidence (learning how
many seeds are present in that area, or a new datapoint about how effective the medication
is). This connection between act and (expected) evidence is distinct from the connection
between action and (expected) reward. That is, the bird might expect that the new area
would not be very good for seeds, but also that sampling from it would yield significant
information. It is these features that give rise to the trade-off, and make exploration part
of the optimal strategy even for agents who do not deem information to be intrinsically
valuable.











Where τ is a stopping time, r is a reward, xi ∈ Xi is a state and β is the survival probability, which is the
probability that the situation continues into the next iteration. Then, the optimal policy is to always play the
arm with the highest Gittens index at each step. This is a computationally expensive procedure (relative to
approximations such as Upper Confidence Bound[6] (UCB) and -greedy Q-learning) that relies on forward
induction [59]. Crucially, the Gittens index of each arm typically declines after each play, so the agent does
not continue to play the same arm even if it generates high reward.
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3.1.3 Extending the Trade-Off
This section takes the basic framework from the previous section, and draws out some
conclusions for practical normativity that I will rely on in the rest of the paper. While
the exploration/exploitation trade-off is well studied in other fields, it has received little
attention in philosophical rational choice theory.
You might be thinking that this trade-off only occurs because of failures particular to
myopic expectations. However, the trade-off also arises for agents who plan many steps
ahead. One series of examples comes from reinforcement learning (RL)[87], a frame-
work for learning in Artifical Intelligence that has been used to model animal and human
cognition among many other applications. In RL, the agent calculates the value of each
progressive step that she might possibly take, multiplied by a discounting factor 4. Rein-
forcement learning algorithms can plan over arbitrarily many future steps, and yet standard
models include perturbations designed to induce exploration. Exploration is explicitly en-
coded in a wide range of RL methods, from basic algorithms such as Q-learning to more
complex model-based methods. So the exploration/exploitation trade-off is not dependent
on myopia.
However, this does not demonstrate that the exploration/explotation trade-off arises
independent of computational limitations. For one, the reward system in RL is somewhat
different than in classical expected utility theory due to the intractability of calculating
every possible state of the world. In particular, rewards in RL are thought of as inputs
from an external system (but usually one internal to the agent) - this means that the value
associated with learning a piece of information can be manipulated by the agent, unlike
the more static, hard-coded use in an orthodox EU calculation. To encode the value of
information, RL systems often encode a direct value for novelty or surprise[84][23]. There
is still a reason to explore in RL because there’s still a risk of getting stuck in a local
4this sometimes includes every possible act, or is cut off at a future horizon - see [52] for arguments that
employing a horizon may actually be optimal
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maximum. The only difference is that now we’re concerned with a maximum over whole
plans rather than single choices.
Now let’s look at what happens to the trade-off in an orthodox decision theory context
where choices are over complete states of the world. Can we map exploitation onto maxi-
mizing expected value - and if so, what is exploration? It might at first seem like balancing
exploration and exploitation would not be a problem for a perfect EU agent. For every
exploration-type advantage, there is an expected-utility rationale. For instance, I should try
each arm because even if there is a small likelihood of finding one better than j, the cumu-
lative long-term reward of switching in that world is quite high. Also, if expected utility
maximization is the paradigm of practical rationality, it shouldn’t be this easy to find a ra-
tionale for violating it. However, Rothschild[77] proves that there is a positive probability
that an optimal, EU-maximizing agent will settle on a policy of choosing the wrong arm
and continue that way forever. This proof assumes an algorithmic, forward-looking agent,
and that the agent correctly believes that the function generating reward is fixed.
Could a different approach to sequential decision-making articulate an optimal EU so-
lution that would never get stuck infinitely with the wrong strategy? This question goes
somewhat outside the scope of the present paper, but I’ll note two ways to deal with it.
One way of incorporating the trade-off here is to allow that exploitation value is only
a heuristic. In making this concession, the trade-off is under the umbrella of EU theory,
but still explains something about how EU-maximizers function. Appealing to the trade-
off will help explain things like variations in behavior over time, answering questions such
as “why did she choose that lever even though it looks unlikely to pay off?”. But since a
perfect EU agent will optimize the solution to the multi-armed bandit problem, the trade-
off between exploration and exploitation is a feature of the expected utility calculation,
not a further factor or contraint. This is the view of the relationship between the trade-off
and expected utility maximization that I will assume throughout this paper. However, I’ll
briefly describe another way of understanding the relationship.
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The second option is to insist that while zooming out to this higher-order level can
accommodate the behaviors I’ve described in the multi-armed bandit case, there’s a trade-
off at work here too. That is, exploration is a way of hedging our expectations, and so
it should apply even if these expectations are complex and higher-order. Nearly any op-
timal EU agent with misleading evidence will benefit from exploring, where that means
going off policy. While the simple multi-armed bandit I presented isn’t complex enough
to display the value of veering off of a full EU strategy, all we need to do is expand it to
involve more radical uncertainty (for instance, uncertainty about what the options are, or
about where new information might come from). So on this view, exploitation maximizes
expected value, exploration puts the agent in a position to learn, and the right combination
of the two leads to maximum cumulative actual (not expected) value. So it’s somewhat
underdetermined whether or not the trade-off holds for expected utility maximizers.
What else can we determine about where the trade-off will be observed? In deciding
how to collect food in some landscapes, an animal benefits from deviating from the strategy
of choosing the patch that looks likely to contain the most food. In other landscapes, there
is no reason to explore. And in still others, there is nothing that could be called exploring
at all. So how can we tell the first kind of environment from the others?
There are two ways to argue that the exploration/exploitation trade-off applies in a new
case without modeling competing methods directly. First, we might demonstrate that the
new case is merely a superficial transformation of an old case. For instance, we might re-
describe the case of clinical trials as a multi-armed bandit problem. However, until we can
demonstrate better outcomes through the use of an exploratory strategy in the new case, it
is in principle possible that any redescription is skipping over relevant differences between
the cases. A second strategy is to derive general features that seem to apply to most or all
cases in which the trade-off obtains. If these features obtain in the new case, then we have
a reason to expect the trade-off to obtain in the new case as well. That is, the first strategy
relies on a one-to-one similarity between cases, the second on categorizing the new case
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according to features observed across a wide range of past cases.
In pursuit of the second strategy, I’ll provide a brief gloss on four features of decision
problems that lead to a meaningful application of the trade-off. Considering the foraging
environments, any setup with only a handful of chances to collect food will not be solved
by exploration, since there won’t be enough future chances to put new information to work.
The animal must not already have enough information to understand the relevant features
of the environment or exploration will not be beneficial; conversely, they must have some
information about the environment, or exploitation will not be meaningful. The problem
must involve uncertainty, but not be totally blind. The animal’s behavior must be systemat-
ically linked with acquiring evidence; that is, there must be behaviors that predictably raise
the probability of getting new evidence, otherwise exploration would be impossible. More
interestingly, these behaviors must not line up perfectly with the behaviors that generate
value. It can’t be that feeding from each patch is always (predictably) good for getting
new evidence in proportion to how (predictably) good it is for getting more food. The
problem must be a sequential one, with a sufficient number of iterations. In short, the ex-
ploration/exploitation trade-off is meaningful when reward and evidence are both linked
to acts (conditions 1 & 2), the degree to which an act generates reward is not directly
proportional to the degree to which the same act generates evidence (condition 3), and a
decision problem is iterated over and over (condition 4). I will return to these conditions in
Section 3.3.
A worry underlying the possibility of extending the trade-off is that this trade-off might
be merely a feature of the formalism, absent or not explanatory in the informal context. If
you weren’t convinced by the ice cream example, consider this lyric from a Frankie Ballard
song: ‘how am I ever gonna get to be old and wise, if I ain’t ever young and crazy?”. I think
this expresses a common sense idea. When you’re young, you have an extra reason to act
crazy - or to deviate from the action that looks like the best bet from a strategic perspective.
The best action for learning is not always the most subjectively rational. The modulation of
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the trade-off over time is what makes it explanatory. Young Frankie Ballard should say yes
to things that old Frankie Ballard should not, for the same reasons as in the formal case.
Finally, one feature of the exploration/exploitation trade-off in action will be crucial for
belief: the relationship between exploration/exploitation and time. As I noted at the end of
Section 3.1.2, there’s a somewhat generic rationale for preferring to explore more earlier
and exploit more later. This reflects a relationship between time and uncertainty - since
exploration is more important when uncertainty is high. However, even while holding
uncertainty fixed, there’s a relationship with time. The information which is reached by
exploring has more value when our agent will have a lot more chances to play the slot
machines. As she approaches the end of her interaction with the current environment, the
diminishing of future opportunities favors exploitation. This is so even if she is still quite
uncertain. Take two agents who are equally uncertain, one pulling the first lever of a long
sequence and the other pulling the final lever. The first agent has more reason to explore
than the second. Of course, in a real-life situation, the boundaries of one context are not
given objectively from the world but the agent herself plays a role in defining what counts
as the same problem, and in acting in ways that change how problems extend over time.
Reward changes in the environment also modulate the trade-off. Traca and Rudin [89]
show that in environments with periodic reward functions, it’s optimal to exploit more
during high-reward periods and explore more during low-reward periods. In their case, the
varying rewards were due to daily traffic patterns on a website, and at higher traffic times,
the recommender algorithm did best by exploiting more, and by exploring more at lower
traffic times. In summary, variations in uncertainty, potential for actions, and total available
reward all modulate the exploration/exploitation trade-off in action.
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3.2 A Case of Exploratory Belief
3.2.1 Why Belief?
I’ll now turn to the case of belief5. This involves changing our focus from practical
value, e.g. attaining dollars from a slot machine, to epistemic value, e.g. acquiring an
accurate model of an environment. That is, while it might make sense to value whichever
beliefs will make me the most money, I’m interested in the kind of value beliefs have when
they are true, regardless of their usefulness.
If there is an exploration-exploitation trade-off in belief, this will have two significant
consequences. First, just like exploring by choosing a flavor at random could be rational,
believing by adopting a belief at random might be rational. Second, just like the initial
bandit case had getting the best pay-off at the current draw in tension with getting the best
pay-offs in the long run, believing with the greatest accuracy now might be at odds with
getting to the most accurate belief in the long run. And all of this would hold without
adding in any non-epistemic value.
3.2.2 The Example
The question I want to ask is: do agents who do well at acquiring epistemically valu-
able beliefs exhibit the exploration/exploitation trade-off? To answer this question, I’ll start
with a literary example. My aim is to present this example as an intuitive and phenomeno-
logically realistic case of exploratory belief. However, the more realistic the example, the
more complex it tends to be, and so I hope the reader will at this stage accept the messiness
of this case as arising from the same features which give it psychological realism.
The description below of an incoherent mental state comes from Mesˇa Selimovic´’s
novel Death and the Dervish. The context is that the narrator, Sheikh Nurudin, has just
5A different version of this paper would target credences (partial beliefs) instead of full belief. This would
have the advantage of more precision, but full belief is accepted as the subject of epistemology by a larger
set of scholars. While I can’t go into details here, the argument for credences would not target probabilistic
incoherence but instead incoherence in the representations themselves.
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passed up an opportunity to mention his incarcerated brother to a powerful woman who
might have been willing to help for the right price. The woman has her own agenda; she
had offered to help Nurudin on the condition that he falsely accuse her own brother. But
Nurudin refused to cooperate. Nurudin belongs to a Sufi order that holds that the best life
is disengaged from politics and invovles no compromises, so the false accusation would be
blatantly against his moral principles. After rejecting the chance to free his brother (that is,
after doing the right thing according to his Sufi beliefs), Nurudin experiences a feeling of
inexplicable anguish:
I had done nothing wrong, but my thoughts were assailed by memories of the
dead silence, of the impenetrable darkness and strange, glimmering lights; of
the ugly tension and the time I had spent anxiously waiting; of our shameful
secrets and thoughts disguised by smiles. I felt as if I had missed something, as
if I had made a mistake somewhere, although I did not know where, or how. I
did not know. But I was not at peace. I could hardly bear this feeling of uneasi-
ness, this anxiety whose source I could not determine. Maybe it was because
I had not mentioned my brother, because I had not insisted that we talk about
him. But I had done that on purpose, in order not to spoil my chances. Or was
it because I had taken part in an shameful conversation and heard shameful
intentions without opposing them, without protecting an innocent man? Only
I had had my own reasons, which were more important than all of that, and it
would not be right for me to reproach myself too much. For each of my actions
I found an excuse, yet my distress remained.
Nurudin is in a conflicted state: he thinks he’s done nothing wrong, but in another sense,
knows that he has (“I had done nothing wrong” but “I felt as if I had missed something”6).
Furthermore, while he is in a situation of moral urgency (figuring out what to do about his
6here, “I felt” is a translation of “cˇinilo mi se” in the original, which does not connote anything particularly
emotional
49
brother, as well as figuring out if his actions are morally wrong), it is not a conflict between
truth and morality. Rather, figuring out the truth - whatever it happens to be - is morally
significant. Nurudin is torn between background beliefs that the Sufi system is morally
correct, and new evidence which suggests that it may be flawed. In response to this conflict
in his evidential situation, Nurudin adopts a divided mental state, where the two conflicting
attitudes play somewhat different roles. That is, the thought that he has made a mistake is
evidenced by his fervid rumination on the past events, searching for where he went wrong.
On the other hand, the thought that he did nothing wrong is evidenced by his conscious
belief and is more in line with his previous beliefs and convictions.
Conflicted Nurudin: Nurudin is receiving conflicting evidence about how to
live that may contradict his deeply held convictions about a Sufi life of spiritual
purity and removal from political affairs. He responds by sometimes believ-
ing that God exists, and the Sufi theory of renouncing political involvement
is morally correct. At other times, he responds by disbelieving in God and
judging the Sufi life to be deluded and morally wrong. These switches are
not brought on by changes in evidence, and further he sometimes uses both
contradictory beliefs in different ways of thinking at the very same time.
As it turns out in the book, Nurudin is at the beginning of a slow shift from being
withdrawn from the world, comfortable in a rigid belief system, to getting involved in an
insurrection and filled with doubt about everything. But this drift from one state to the other
takes up the whole book (which occurs over something like a year in real time) and in this
period, he is deeply incoherent.
I’ll model Nurudin as if he flips his belief ‘switch’ between one context and the next,
going back and forth from believing in the moral propositions which make up the Sufi
project, to rejecting those same beliefs. In the passage above, he is in two contexts simul-
taneously, since the two beliefs each play a role in a different kind of cognitive activity.
At other times, he may fully believe or disbelieve; maybe he’s a true believer when in the
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tekija (a monastery-like place where the dervishes live), and full of doubt when moving
about the city. But note that the shifts cannot be due to evidence, since he is in two of
these states above while presumably having exactly the same evidence (given that he is
one person at one time). Further, it’s hard ot imagine what kind of evidence would justify
repeated, context-driven oscillations - and it’s even more of a stretch to stipulate that kind
of evidence is present in Nurudin’s case without any further information. If this strikes you
as unintuitive, imagine Nurudin as someone who is optimistic in the mornings and pes-
simistic at night, and so believes that God exists in his optimistic mornings, and conversely
at nights.
By modeling Nurudin as oscillating between beliefs, I am rejecting two others ways to
treat the case: as involving a consistent attitude of suspension of judgment or partial (but
coherent) degree of belief. These readings need not be impossible, but I’ll note some rea-
sons why I am treating this case differently. Suspension of judgment is a doxastic attitude
distinct from belief and disbelief characterized by the agent stopping short of coming to a
verdict about the truth of some proposition (the status of suspension as an attitude is some-
what controversial, see [40] for discussion). As far as suspension of judgment, Nurudin is
unusually conflicted, and his conflict involves many of the behaviors associated with belief:
he asserts that he believes, his behavior is explained by a conviction in a proposition, and
so on. Suspension of judgment is an alternative response, and one that I’ll compare to his
actual response later on.
Having a partial (but coherent) credence in the moral propositions in question might
sometimes express itself in belief-like and disbelief-like behaviors depending on the stakes.
However, we would expect these behavioral switches to correspond to switches in the stakes
and/or odds, and by stipulation, Nurudin is oscillating back and forth by following an
internal routine rather than an external shift. This doesn’t mean that it is impossible to
model him in either of these two alternative ways, but merely that it is plausible to model his











Figure 3.2: An epistemological version of the bandit problem, where choosing an arm represents
changing your belief state. Just as the agent in Figure 3.1 rationally alternates between
the arms even though endlessly repeating the highest estimated arm has the maximum
myopic value, Nurudin rationally samples from all of the arms in this figure, or perhaps
alternates between j and k, rather than picking the myopically optimal arm j over and
over.
As such, by adopting the strategy I’ve described, Nurudin is surely taking a hit in myopic
epistemic value.
Further, Nurudin presumably does not plan on being in this divided state forever; in-
stead, he’s developing two incoherent projects in parallel in order to eventually be able to
figure out which is better. Since the belief that the Sufi system is valid is one that comes
with an entire moral and descriptive framework, it’s reasonable to think that either future
coherent state will have very different standards of evaluation, and recommend distinct
experiments. So Nurudin is also in a state of meta-uncertainty, which he responds to by
moving to a less accurate state (in this case by all standards) that might improve his prospect
of learning.
3.3 Argument for a Belief/Action Symmetry
In this section, I argue that the multi-armed bandit and the problem Nurudin faces
contain essentially the same structure. Therefore, the exploration/exploitation trade-off is
operative in both cases. More generally, I present a view on which the trade-off should be
a normal part of our reasoning about what to believe.
To make this argument, I’ll sketch the features of the bandit case, and then extend them
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to Nurudin’s. It’s important to note here that parity between the bandit and Nurudin is a
stronger criterion than necessary to establish the existence of an exploration/exploitation
trade-off in belief; multi-armed bandits are one of many problems whose solutions exhibit
this trade-off ranging from tree search to applied problems in robotics.
Here’s an overview of these conditions:
action (standard) bandit belief bandit
Condition 1: act generates evidence: usually usually
Condition 2: act results in reward: sometimes sometimes
Condition 3: evidence and reward come apart: usually sometimes
Condition 4: procedure is iterated: approximately approximately
As I noted, bandit problems exhibit a trade-off because we expect pulling the lever to give
us evidence about the underlying function, and also a reward. These features come apart,
as in the case of a high-reward lever that has been pulled many times, so that one more
pull will likely provide little evidence but a lot of money. And finally the process needs
to be iterated - otherwise exploitation would always trump exploration. I aim to show that
all of these features are shared with belief: belief changes what kinds of evidence we can
expect to receive based on our dispositions to imagine and conduct experiments, it gives
us a ‘reward’ in the form of accurate beliefs, and these two can come apart in cases like
Nurudin’s. Finally, each act of forming a belief, like each action, is in some sense perfectly
unique. But in both cases, we’re engaged in a complex process that can be approximated
for some purposes by treating it as a series of iterated moves.
A background issue here concerns internalism and externalism. An externalist version
of these conditions would require that, for instance, reward and evidence actually generally
come apart, regardless of whether the agent could plausibly be expected to know that fact.
On the other hand, a standard internalist version would require that the agent be able to
predict reasonably well when the two would come apart in order for it to be rational for
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her to respond to this in her beliefs. A pure internalist version might allow that reward
and evidence might even be fully coincident in the environment but allow a trade-off so
long as the agent reasonably (and falsely) believes that they will come apart. This is a
deep issue about the structure of epistemic normativity that I can’t hope to adjudicate here.
In lieu of that, I’ll proceed using the standard internalist version - that is, by arguing that
these conditions both hold of the environment and can usually be tracked by agents in an
internally predictable fashion. I use this conception because it combines the external and
the internal requirements, and so by showing that it can be satisfied, I can also establish
that the weaker conditions (pure internalist and externalist) can also be satisfied.
There are some key differences between this ‘belief bandit’ and the standard multi-
armed bandit problem. Most significantly, in Nurudin’s case, the value of the various arms
are not independent, since they concern belief (or suspension) about a single proposition.
In contrast, in the standard bandit, the pay-offs of each arm are independent of one another.
This means that in principle, repeated sampling from a single arm in the ‘belief bandit’ will
give you information about the pay-offs of the other arms. However, in practice, the pay-
offs of a belief that Sufism is correct concern other propositions as well, for instance beliefs
about particular Sufi principles, Quranic interpretation, and so on. And likewise, the belief
that Sufism is mistaken will lead Nurudin to learn about other propositions such as the
effectiveness of various forms of political action, or the location of a political meeting, and
so on (see Figure 3.3 for an illustration). These propositions may not be fully independent
of one another, but they stand in complex dependency relations such that an agent with
imperfect information or who is not logically omniscientg will never be able to recover the
truth of a proposition about the agenda of an undercover political group in Sarajevo from
propositions about a Medieval interpretation of the Quran.
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The Sufi project is valid
The Sufi project is invalid
The system of fiqh is not authoritative
The Quranic account of essence implies that essense precedes existence
closeness to God is a state that has content
Deferrence to authority is a requirement of self-discipline
Political action requires compromising one’s aims
Experiential knowledge is transferrable
Political unity must precede effective political decision-making
Revolutions require a charismatic figurehead
Figure 3.3: Nurudin’s position on the proposition in question will lead him to consider and form
beliefs about different sets of propositions, whose truth is related in complex ways to
the truth of the original proposition.
3.4 Conditions 1 and 2
Conditions 1 and 2 are easily satisfied by belief. For condition 1, beliefs lead to the
acquisition of evidence through experimentation and imagination. The most obvious case
here is that of methodological beliefs - if you believe that particle collision is not a very
good method of discovery, this will lead you to conduct different experiments and so receive
different evidence than were you to believe differently. This is not a fluke. Because our
intervention in the environment and our process of imagination are guided by our beliefs,
they will fluctuate as our beliefs fluctuate.
For condition 2, if we treat accuracy as reward, as is commonly done in any kind of con-
sequentialist epistemology, beliefs are predictably evaluable for reward. (see Section 3.7
for a definition and discussion of epistemic consequentialism). That is, when your belief is
accurate, this constitutes a reward. Of course, we don’t always know when our beliefs are
correct. But in plenty of cases, we find out whether we were correct or incorrect.
Even for the non-consequentialist, beliefs can be treated as generating reward. This just
means distinguishing two kinds of intrinsic, non-consequentialist value: the kind of value
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beliefs have purely in virtue of their internal components, and some further kind of value.
For instance, on many accounts, beliefs have additional epistemic value if they amount to
knowledge, and since this value is not perfectly luminous to the agent, we can treat it as a
‘result’. In this context, that just means there is some epistemic distance between attaining
the state and attaining the reward: you can know that you’re in the former state (believing
that P) without knowing you’ve attained the latter (knowing that P). Likewise, it may be
the act of eating ice-cream is inseparable from its intrinsic tastiness value, but that fact
is sometimes inaccessible to me and so can’t play a direct role in planning. I’ll return to
the question of whether my argument presupposes epistemic consequentialism in section
Section 3.7.
3.5 Condition 3
This condition is doing most of the work by pulling current reward and future evidence
apart, so I treat it in more depth. I present two connections between belief and other acts
that result in a gap between the expected reward (i.e. accuracy or truth) of a package of
beliefs, and the expected evidential value (i.e. likelihood to lead to new and/or significant
information being gleaned). The first connection is a familiar one between belief and ex-
perimentation, and the second is the more rarely discussed connection between belief and
imaginative search. In addition to demonstrating that condition 3 obtains, I aim to uncover
what features and limitations an agent and her environment must have in order for this
condition to obtain.
3.5.1 Belief and Evidence-Gathering
If there is such a thing as rational evidence-gathering, it depends at least indirectly
on what you believe, involving choosing interventions that you believe are likely to be
effective, depending on background beliefs about how the results come about, and so on.
For condition 3 to obtain, we need to sometimes be in a position where one way of believing
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is best supported by current evidence, but another way of believing is more likely to result
in gaining new evidence, particularly if we are mistaken. Experimentation and other forms
of evidence gathering are points at which our beliefs affect our future evidence, so a natural
way to describe exploratory beliefs is through this connection. In brief, our beliefs constrain
our experimentation, and we can sometimes get stuck choosing the wrong experiments over
and over because they are justified by our current evidence. So perturbing our beliefs can
solve the problem by forcing us to occassionally choose experiments and gather evidence in
ways that are exploratory. Nurudin, for instance, will gather evidence differently in his two
ways of believing, and there are reasons to think this is to his benefit; he’s able to break out
of the restrictive moral framework in part because his seemingly irrational beliefs push him
to act in various odd ways that bring new evidence. Likewise, Railton[72] and Kitcher[53]
raise the possibility that individual scientists being committed to a hypothesis beyond what
the evidence supports might help the scientific community arrive at truth in the long run, in
part by incentivising the right sort of experiments.
However, maybe all we need is to accept7 some helpful propositions rather than change
our beliefs. On this view, evidence and reward need not come apart, because reward at-
taches to belief and evidence attaches to acceptance. An intuitive response to Nurudin’s
case is that the best thing for him to do would be to accept the two incoherent propositions
about moral living in different contexts, rather than believe them. Railton’s scientist should
just accept that his hypothesis is true, rather than believe it. This is presumably what would
be recommended by Van Fraassen [91] among others. Note that the disagreement between
my view and the acceptance view is about a particular role of acceptance, namely whether
exploratory acceptance can explain all epistemically rational exploration; I do not intend to
deny that acceptance is a genuine, rational mental state in many cases.
What is meant by acceptance? On one end of the spectrum is the view that acceptance
7I here discuss acceptance instead of supposition. While supposing that P and accepting that P are both
alternatives to believing that P, they differ in that supposing that P would not lead you to experiment as though
P were true. To simplify somewhat, you suppose for the purpose of thought but accept for the purpose of
action.
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just involves acting as if something were the case without changing any beliefs or making
any new inferences. On the other end is the idea that acceptance is descriptively identical to
belief, it just falls under different normative standards. The latter in this context is question-
begging, since I’m arguing that the normative standards for belief should cover exploration
as well. Likewise for the suggestion that acceptance and belief differ only insofar as beliefs
are only sensitive to direct, truth-seeking considerations (see Shah and Velleman [82]).
I’ll consider two versions of the acceptence objection, one where acceptance is just
acting-as-if, and the other where it involves some doxastic changes but not as far as in
belief (perhaps inferences drawn from the accepted proposition are quarantined away from
the agents other beliefs, for instance).
In the first case, if Nurudin accepts and does not accept the Sufi moral system in differ-
ent contexts, but suspends judgment, there are two issues. First, it’s not clear that it would
even be possible to act as if Sufism is correct and incorrect- acting does not allow for syn-
chronic partitions the way belief does. But it seems possible to swing erratically between
two ways of acting, so this reply can be avoided at least in Nurudin’s case. Second, given
some plausible psychological postulates, the advantages that Nurudin gets from believing
will not transfer to acting-as-if. For instance, it was his wholehearted investment in Sufism
that allowed him to stay up late studying; if he was motivated by his belief, and acceptance
is just acting-as-if, then we have nothing to replace that motivation. Treating acceptance
as a mere pattern of action by definition does not give us any resources to explain moti-
vation. And further, exploration is already harder to motivate than exploitation, since it is
by definition not expected to be rewarding8. But I concede that this response depends on
the posited psychological peculiarities of humans. The case of imagination, discussed in
the next section, will be more apt for dismissing the possibility of reducing exploring by
believing to exploring by acting.
On the other hand, let’s say acceptance involves some but not all of the internal prop-
8I owe this point to Peter Railton.
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erties of belief. Which features might then separate the two? One idea is that acceptance
might be conditional, ready to be taken back when necessary; we might want to make sure
to keep track of all the inferential consequences of an accepted proposition. I’ll come back
to this as well in the next section.
In general, the connection between belief and evidence-gathering gives us a reason to
be willing to take an accuracy hit in order to explore. Agents like us are motivated to
gather evidence that we judge to be promising, interesting or fruitful based on our other
beliefs. These experiments form epistemic projects, and can be said to rely on a shared
basis of belief in which we need to be invested in order to be motivated to gather the
relevant evidence. However, even if this motivational structure were not in place, we might
expect that rational agents would be constrained in their experimentation by their beliefs.
Even if we place acceptance between belief and evidence-gathering in some cagses, this
relationship will still persist, albeit indirectly, since beliefs will affect acceptance which
will affect evidence-gathering. Thus some of our beliefs can still be evaluated based on
their consequences for acquiring evidence, though these consequences will be somewhat
indirect.
To give up on a normative connection between what we believe and what evidence
we collect is to invest in an epistemology that starkly separates evidential response from
inquiry. This move should be a kind of last resort, since it involves relinquishing a plausible
route to explaining why experiments are justified. In the next section, I’ll argue that the
creation of a hypothesis is a kind of internal inquiry that depends on beliefs but carries
consequences for future learning.
3.5.2 Consideration and New Hypotheses
In this section, imagine that Nurudin has an unlimited capacity to control and shape his
own motivational faculty, and let’s set aside the doubts in the previous section to assume
that for the purposes of experimentation, exploration in belief can be easily replaced with
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exploration in action without epistemic cost, and with in fact with some epistemic benefit.
Nurudin will go ahead and behave as if he doesn’t believe that the Sufi way is morally
correct in some contexts, and does in others, but when it comes to belief, he’ll suspend
judgment.
This Nurudin, I’ll argue, will face a dilemma when it come to constructing new hy-
potheses. Normally (at least for an agent who isn’t logically omniscient) imagination is
one route to forming new theories. In particular, we don’t imagine totally random possi-
bilities out of the blue, but we use our current understanding of how things actually are,
together with beliefs about what is and isn’t possible, to come up with new options. For
instance, an agent might start by visualizing an atom according to her current theory which
involves a series of rings, and play around with the possible ring shapes, crossing them
over and changing their sizes (according to her ideas about what shapes can do (innate or
otherwise)). By this process, she comes up with a few alternative ideas.
Figure 3.4 is a rough schema for how this kind of constructive mind-wandering works,
and Figure 3.5 describes some of the possible constraints imposed by belief. Nurudin
starts out by considering something consistent with his current theory, and relaxes various
assumptions in an incremental way in order to explore the (infinite) space of possible hy-
potheses. The stars represent possibilities which he has fixed on as salient alternatives to
the current theory. Nearness here stands for some kind of conceptual similarity - this might
be constructed by the search function and hence subjective, or objective relations among
the propositions.
Now, the original ’Conflicted Nurudin’ had two starting points in the space, the belief
that God exists and his other related theological commitments and the more politically
minded, doubt-ridden cluster. Some of the epistemic benefit that Nurudin gets from having
the two incoherent theories is that he can explore the space of possibilities in two very
different ways that advance both projects. What if his starting points are not beliefs but
acceptances or suppositions?
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space of possible theories
Sufi mysticism
atheism
Figure 3.4: Nurudin’s wandering consideration. As he explores the space of possibilities from two
different starting points (rectangles), he encounters different propositions of the sort
listed in Fig. 3, depicted here as stars. The process of moving around this space has
some degree of randomness, but also reflects the generalization that positions nearer to
starting points are easier to explore and attract more attention, ceteris paribus.
points of contact between belief and imaginative search
1. Starting points: Imagination often involves starting with our current beliefs about the
world, and departing from them incrementally. So in general, we explore neighboring
theories first.
2. Side-constraints: Imaginative exercises often involve coming up against previously im-
plicit limits - for instance, in thought experiments when we observe an unanticipated
reaction in ourselves that shapes the way we fill in a case.
3. Goals: Imaginative search is a combination of pure random wandering and goal-oriented
activity, and the goal-directed end of the continuum depends on beliefs about what’s
valuable and how to achieve those ends.
4. Stopping rules: For a computationally limited agent, or one interested in computational
efficiency, it will be necessary to regulate the amount of search, for instance allocating
more time to search when the group seems to have reached a plateau or less when current
possibilities overwhelm resources to pursue confirmation of those possibilities.
5. Costs and cost analysis: Some theories cost more resources to build than others - another
consideration that favors nearby possibilities.
Figure 3.5: Sketch of possible relations between beliefs and imaginative search
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This sketch is preliminary, but accords with empirical data on the kind of cognitive
processing that supports creativity; for instance, Yilmaz et al.[97] detail how new ideas
tend to develop as variations on existing ones, and creativity is often enhanced by pushing
people to adopt a divergent starting point.
An objection might arise here. In the case of some everyday theorizing, we sometimes
start from a supposition rather than a belief. Or when reading fiction, we can start our
wandering from the fictional cluster of ideas and move outward, perhaps filling in other
details of that imagined world by varying the fictional events (‘what if Dr. Zhivago hadn’t
gotten on that train?’). So couldn’t Nurudin start from acceptance?
Here I think we can allow that while we sometimes begin our wanderings from accepted
premises, in general there is an important relationship between belief and consideration that
doesn’t carry over to acceptance. For one, beliefs can guide our wandering not just as start-
ing points but as side-constraints; in this case, we don’t need to attend to the constraint
in order to use it. In fact in the case of imaginative resistance, philosophers have debated
extensively just what some of the common side-constraints might be. Acceptance, in con-
trast, even on a very belief-based conception, is separated somewhat from other beliefs and
inferences, and so does not intrude as much into mind-wandering. Instead, to employ sup-
position or acceptance in imagination, we’ll need to either explicitly trigger the accepted
proposition itself or already be ‘within the quarantined zone’ so to speak. In other words,
in imaginative resistance, we have trouble turning off some of our existing beliefs about,
say, morality. Acceptance, by definition, is easier to turn on and off than belief, so does not
intrude as much into the exercise of imagination, including the use of imagination under
discussion: building new theories.
3.6 Condition 4
I suspect that the simplifications necessary to treat belief as an iterated problem are of a
kind with the simplifications necessary in the case of action - in neither case is there literal
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repetition, but it’s close enough for the idealization to be useful in action, so it should also
be for belief.
One wrinkle is that actions like instances of pulling a lever are obviously segmented,
whereas instances of believing are hard to separate from one another. How often am I in
the position to say that I’ve believed in God seven times? But this feature is not significant
for the analogy - what is required by iteration is that the same belief problem arises over
and over again, so that the agent can vary her behavior or keep it consistent. Even though
beliefs themselves are not properly segmented, we can categorize the evidential situation
as segmented and repeatable just as in the case of action.
3.7 Objections, Alternatives
In this section, I consider objections and alternatives to my account of the trade-off for
belief.
One significant challenge is that if we accept the rationality of the exploration/exploitation
trade-off in action, positing an additional trade-off for belief amounts to two solutions to
one problem, where each solution is on its own sufficient. That is, isn’t introducing explo-
ration twice overkill?
There’s something undoubtedly correct in this suggestion - agents who introduce ar-
bitrary oscillations, randomness or other exploration behaviors at multiple points face a
difficulty in making sure these interventions are consistent. In some situations, introducing
exploration at the level of action will be enough to reduce the agent’s chance of getting
stuck in a local maximum. And likewise for imaginative search; if we introduce random-
ness into the search process itself, that will solve some of the problems of a purely ex-
ploitative approach. Note that this move still involves changing the canonical framework
for exploration in action, since we are interested here in the epistemic rationality of actions.
However, this will not always be the case, and there are benefits to belief exploration
which do not carry over to imaginative exploration. Consider how it is that Nurudin’s
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beliefs allow him to explore in Figure 3.4. It’s not just that he happens to explore the-
ories that are adjacent to his beliefs; these theories are made more accessible to him by
his beliefs. Because he believes in Sufism, through coordination of actions, imagination
and other modes of thought, he’s amassed resources to understand that theory and how it
might be altered to create new versions. For one not familiar with Sufism in that intimate,
thorough-going way, it wouldn’t be clear, for instance, that there are two versions of the
view, one which takes the mystical state of oneness with God to have content, and one
which doesn’t. Given this, in order to gain the advantage of the incoherent package by only
changing actions, there would need to be a coordinated exploratory change to both external
actions and imaginative ones. Changing the underlying beliefs is a natural and effective
way of achieving this coordination. In other words, fully inhabiting the Sufi framework
is necessary for exploring these fine-grained questions about divine experience that bear
little to no relation to action. Further, even changing external actions and imagination in a
coordinated way would likely be insufficient; part of how belief makes regions of possible
space accesible is intrinsic, coming from the fact that believing in something involves enter-
taining that proposition fully, in a way that seems deeper than other forms of non-doxastic
consideration.
Another objection is that my argument, and perhaps the view itself, presupposes epis-
temic consequentialism. Epistemic consequentialism is the controversial view that epis-
temic rationality reduces to a decision-theoretic problem where truth, accuracy etc. is as-
signed some kind of utility. I’d rather not take a stance on this issue here, so I’ll note a way
for an epistemic deontologist to accomodate the rationality of exploratory beliefs, and one
way for an epistemic virtue theorist to accomodate it. These are not meant to exhaust the
possibilities, but merely demonstrate the flexibility of the account.
Epistemic virtue theory could hold that exploratory belief is the expression of an under-
lying virtue or skill - something like creativity or open-mindedness. On this view, the kind
of story I’ve sketched can be used to show that open-mindedness as a virtue is unified with
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other epistemic virtues. But primarily, the function of telling this story about the trade-
off serves to describe what open-mindedness looks like and how it can be distinguished
from other features of epistemic rationality, namely whatever goes into exploitation. On
a responsabilist virtue-theoretic picture, open-mindedness might be its own valuable char-
acteristic, whereas on a reliabilist virtue-theoretic picture, the argument I’ve given in this
paper shows how exploration is a reliable practice.
An epistemic deontologist is canonically not interested in justifications based purely
in the results of believing in some way. They could allow for exploratory beliefs by ap-
pealing to other considerations beyond generating the right results, usually something like
conforming to epistemic requirements. These requirements themselves cannot be justified
by their results, otherwise we have rule-consequentialism (which is probably the most nat-
ural fit with the argument given in this paper). One non-consequentialist justification for
a requirement to explore might be that trying out new beliefs is an intrinsic part of being
epistemically responsible. The possibility of getting stuck in a local maximum, just like
the possibility of hurting someone with a negligent bit of landscaping, would thus dictate
responsible behavior even if the agent were not actually at a local minimum or her gar-
den did not actually hurt anyone. Exploration is not a black-box reliability machine like
using a crystal ball; it’s a practice that’s integrated into and regulated by our other ways
of believing, and the account I’ve given here shows how we are always navigating the
exploration/exploitation trade-off as we move through the process of learning.
Finally, it makes sense to ask what the upshot of this account is for epistemic ratio-
nality; does this mean that exploration is the only rational way to believe? I aim to have
established a weaker thesis: exploring by believing is sometimes epistemically permissible.
This follows if we assume the following:
Optimality Thesis: if S believing that P will probably lead to an optimal
outcome in terms of accuracy and/or truth, and S knows this, it’s epistemically
permissible for S to believe that P .
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This thesis is controversial since it allows cases of self-fulfilling belief to establish
permissability. For instance, if my belief that I will succeed in the exam is part of what
makes it likely for me to succeed in the exam (by, say, increasing my confidence and thus
my performance), the optimality thesis tells us that it’s permissible for me to believe that
I will succeed. Objections to this result are often motivated by evidentialism, roughly
holding that self-fulfilling beliefs are not based on evidence in the proper way and so are
epistemically impermissable (see [93]).
Exploratory beliefs share a feature with self-fulfilling belief: both cases use the (ex-
pected) results of believing in order to justify believing in the first place. But they are
different in the following way: self-fulfilling beliefs make themselves rational by making
the proposition under consideration true. They are only rational once they are believed.
On the contrary, exploratory beliefs do not make any change to the truth of the proposition
under consideration, nor do they make themselves rational in a causal sense. They are per-
missible because they lead predictably to good epistemic consequences, but in the standard
way. The weirdness of self-fulfilling beliefs is this non-standard, non-ratifiable way, which
is not shared with exploratory beliefs. 9 So we can amend the thesis as follows:
Optimality Thesis*: if S believing that P will probably lead to an optimal
outcome in terms of accuracy and/or truth in the standard way, and S knows
this, it’s epistemically permissible for S to believe that P .
It’s beyond the scope of this paper to reformulate the optimality thesis to reflect this
difference properly - specifying the way in which self-fulfilling beliefs are non-standard or
circular is a complicated project that requires a comprehensive survey of the variety of ways
in which self-fulfillment works. But I take it to be sufficient in this context to point out that
the difference between self-fullfilling and exploratory beliefs is precisely the feature which
makes self-fulfilling belief look epistemically questionable.




Our country song asked:“how am I ever gonna get to be old and wise, if I ain’t ever
young and crazy?”. In this paper, I’ve argued that this same line of thought applies to belief
- in the beginning of inquiry, we often should believe in order to explore rather than to
exploit, but as inquiry progresses, we should drift towards maximizing evidential value.
This is a feature shared between action and belief, and exploits the rational connection
between belief and imagination.
An implication is that just as in the practical case where reward variability modulated
the trade-off, this analysis of belief gives us room to make a parallel move. Epistemic
pay-offs surely vary, and often in a predictable way. I need the right theory more urgently
when I’m starting to build my machine or about to go on an expedition. At other times,
such as idle inquiry, preliminary stages, or even after the plans for the machine are all in
place, the stakes are lower. The framework I’ve put forward would allow us to say that the
epistemically rational behavior depends on the pay-off - and tends toward exploitation in
the high risk case and exploration in the low risk case.
In some sense, what I’ve said here is reminiscent of talk that motivates moving away
from belief towards acceptance and other belief-like states. However, by demonstrating a
symmetric trade-off in the case of action, I hope to have pushed back against this project.
If the exploration/exploitation trade-off is a ubiquitous feature of goal-oriented rationality,
then rather than classifying exploratory belief-like states as forming a separate category,
we should expect the trade-off to occur over states of a single type. Further, by treating the
phenomenon as a trade-off in the rationalization of a single state (i.e. belief), my theory
has an advantage in terms of parsimony and strength . In other words, my opponent must
explain how beliefs and acceptences combine in regulating behavior during exploration,
and this may be a difficult task.
My view is also more flexible in describing the gradient of rational grounds as a modu-
lation of the trade-off, since any mixture of rational grounds for a single proposition in an
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acceptance-based theory can only be described by the unfortunate scheme X% acceptance,
1−X% belief. In other words, it’s hard to imagine what it would mean to half-believe and
half-accept something, whereas it’s easy to see what it means to have a belief that results
from being 50% or even 21.87% exploratory. The trade-off I have proposed is naturally
graded in a way that matches the underlying normative fact that our circumstances give us
reason to explore to varying degrees, shifting over time.
More generally, the choice between acceptance and belief as the states at stake here
rests on what we think belief is fundamentally about. On one view, belief is the state that
we use in inquiry: it guides us in performing experiments, and in dreaming up new theories.
Belief is the state linked most closely to our response to evidence. If this is our picture of
what belief does, then we should not choose a normative framework that starkly separates
belief from experimentation and imagination.
Finally, these results shake up the classic debate in epistemology between James[51]
and Clifford[27] over the reasons to believe. To simplify somewhat, Clifford’s position
was that belief should always be based on the evidence, and undertaken for pure epistemic
reasons, whereas James held that we should sometimes believe beyond what the evidence
can support for practical reasons. The exploration-exploitation trade-off for belief suggests
that there is a third position available here. Sometimes, purely epistemic reasons that have





ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I investigate the role of novelty in memory processing, and
argue that selecting for (the right kind of) novelty in memory is a distinct rational com-
putation. I first discuss an intuitive example of how novelty can be especially memorable.
Then, I compare psychological work on novelty in large-scale theories of cognition, as well
as localized in memory. While there is a wide consensus that novelty is tracked and used
in some way, both in memory and in other kinds of cognition, what we do with novelty
and what kind of thing counts as novelty is deeply controversial. I argue that this evidence
loosely suggests a specific role for novelty in memory, and then provide a conceptual ac-
count of how such a computation would work. The chapter concludes with an argument
that this novelty computation is rational, and yet goes against some of our assumptions
about rational cognitive processing.
Introduction
This chapter aims to make modest progress on understanding the rational relationship
between acquiring evidence and building a model of the world. Typically, we think of this
relationship as flowing from left to right; we acquire evidence, and in response, alter our
model of the world. However, the reverse direction is also part of the story; we acquire
evidence based on our model of the world, that is, we seek out information based in part
on prior expectations about where new information might be found and how to get to it.
Putting these together creates a cycle where each direction might in principle constrain and
effect the other - a loop, in other words. The aim of this paper is to ask, in light of this loop,
does the fact that we use our models of the world to guide evidence acquisition constrain
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how these models should look? An affirmative answer to this question asserts that there
is a forward-looking, evidential rationale for holding a certain view of the world. Taking
our memory systems to be in the business of maintaining these views, I will present a kind
of cognitive operation performed by the memory system which can only be explained by
appealing to such a forward-looking rationale. This phenomenon, the selective memory for
anomalous events, will be an instance of the rational loop between acquiring evidence and
building a model of the world: a way of storing information that makes sense in light of
how it drives us to get new evidence.
I’ll start with an intuitive example before surveying some relevant findings from psy-
chology. Consider the following situation:
Offensive Question: Azadeh was at a talk. Her friend, who is kind and
even-tempered, asked very aggressively why the speaker employed such a ter-
rible methodology. At the time, she thought to herself: “I can’t possibly imag-
ine what he was thinking! There’s no judgment that I could make about a talk
that would lead me to ask that kind of question”. This incident stuck in her
mind long after she had forgotten all the other questions at that particular talk.
But she did not revise her judgment about her friend’s character or the deeply
offensive nature of the question - instead, she felt uneasy about what had hap-
pened and regarded it as an unexplained fluke. Later, Azadeh and her friend
talk about what happened, and she comes to understand what had upset him,
and why asking the question was consistent with his good character; he needed
to publicly register his disagreement in order to demonstrate that the speaker
did not speak on his behalf.
Azadeh’s attitude from the time of the talk to the time of the later discussion can be
characterized in the following way: she remembered what had happened, but did not in-
corporate the evidence furnished by the incident into her other beliefs about her friend’s
character. That is, in ruminating about how offensive her friend’s question was, she seemed
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to believe that the event occurred. However, by resisting following these thoughts out to
their usual conclusion and reducing her confidence in his moral character, Azadeh seemed
to not really believe. You could imagine that this resistance is active, driven by a conscious
desire to avoid judging her friend negatively, but more often it might be subconscious, a
path her thoughts tend not to take, the basis of which need not be luminous to her. I’ll refer
to memories that we treat in this way as anomalous memories. While there is a component
to this example that goes beyond memory into perception, action, and attention, I take it
that there is also a distinctive kind of memory involved. These memories are distinguished
by their evidential attitude in the following way:
Anomalous memories: A memory M of event P is treated as an anomaly
when the agent singles it out for selective consolidation and retrieval based
in part on the fact that P is surprising, unlikely, or odd, and when the agent
is at least sometimes not disposed to draw inferences (whether conscious or
unconscious) based on M because of P ’s oddness.
In Azadeh’s case, the event was surprising since it deviated from her expectation of her
friend’s behavior. Because we might have more or less firmly set expectations, deviations
from expectation can mean a variety of qualitatively different things. For instance, I once
remember seeing a dog in a cafe that raised a single eyebrow at me. I don’t believe that I
antecedently thought that dogs cannot raise their eyebrows. In fact, it had never occurred
to me to consider whether dogs have eyebrows. Even if I considered the question, I might
have been in doubt. But the real phenomenon was just so bizarre and human-like that it
stuck vividly in my memory. So at this point, I will leave ‘surprising, unlikely, or odd’ in
the description above as deliberately vague. If we make progress on the question of the
rational function of anomalous memories, it should be possible to be more specific about
what kinds of events should trigger this response.
You might notice that anomalous memories have a similar structure to the kinds of
scientific anomalies discussed most notably by Thomas Kuhn[55]. For instance, the sci-
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entific community treated the procession of the perihelion of Mercury, a piece of data that
famously did not fit into Newtonian mechanics, as an anomaly. For Kuhn, the chief func-
tion of anomalies is to accumulate until the collective weight of the evidence furnished by
the anomalies provokes some scientists to jump ship from the prevailing framework. Of
course, in order to accumulate, anomalies must be recorded and classified, but the focus of
Kuhn’s account is on what happens in response to the anomalies, not how the anomalies
are generated and maintained. Kuhn would be loathe to describe anomalies in these cog-
nitive terms, and might be even more unhappy with the flatfooted, rationalistic treatment
they will receive in this paper. And so while there are significant differences in both the
descriptive and normative elements of memory anomalies and scientific anomalies, I note
the similarity here in order to convince the reader that understanding memory anomalies is
connected in potentially fruitful ways to broader questions in epistemology and philosophy
of science.
This chapter will consider the rationality of anomalous memories. That is, where does
this cognitive operation fit into the behavior of an epistemically responsible agent? Might
we be irrational to disregard anomalous events in memory, and if so, is this the same kind of
irrationality that occurs when we believe contradictions or deny a deductive implication of
our beliefs? These questions are a window into a deeper question: what role does memory
have in epistemology?
I’ll argue that generating and maintaining anomalous memories is a distinctive rational
function of the long term memory system (hereafter, I’ll use memory to refer to long term
memory unless otherwise noted). This claim has two parts. First, this kind of cognitive
behavior is epistemically rational, meaning it makes sense from the perspective of design-
ing an agent that aims to get at truth about the world. Second, it is a cognitive operation
that is particular to the memory system, meaning that the operation itself is a memory op-
eration as opposed to a computation that just happens to take place in the memory system.
And so these jointly entail that memory itself has a distinctive, active epistemic role, con-
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tra the explicit views espoused by Senor[81], and the implicit consensus whereby memory
is a topic receiving minimal attention in (contemporary analytic) epistemology. A second
consequence is that this operation is a rational step away from coherence, which raises a
challenge for coherence-based approaches to epistemology such as some versions of evi-
dentialism, though I’ll argue that a diachronic coherence approach can capture these cases
perfectly.
In Section 4.1, I start with a brief survey of empirical work on the cognition of anoma-
lies within the memory system as well as in online cognition. In Section 4.2, I argue for
the distinctiveness of novelty within memory, and in Section 4.3, I present a series of con-
siderations in favor of the view that maintaining and generating anomalous memories is
epistemically rational. Section 4.4 concludes with a discussion of what these cases show
us about the value of coherence.
4.1 Cognition of Anomalies
An anomalous memory, as I use the term, refers to a kind of memory representation
(a representation of an odd event), and a fairly specific way of treating that representation
(attending to it and yet keeping an evidential distance). Whether the anecdote I provided
translates into a general cognitive phenomenon is hard to determine empirically, given the
particularity of a case like Offensive Question; what strikes Azadeh as bizarre would not
necessary even be noticed by another conference attendee. However, there is a broader
body of literature on the ways in which novelty is attended to, avoided, and remembered.
The initial focus of this section is on contextualizing this anecdotal description within
this broader area of work on the role of novelty in cognition. I first discuss novelty in large-
scale models of the mind, and then in the more specific domain of memory. Novelty, as a
preliminary gloss, will mean something like unexpected stimuli.
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4.1.1 The Big Picture
Novelty has recently been the subject of several large-scale theories of cognition, in hu-
mans, other animals, and artificial agents. Consider the following three research programs:
1. Singh et al. encoded their reinforcement learning agents with a preference for novel
stimuli, and showed that in the contexts studied, the novelty-preferring agent per-
forms better than an agent without novelty preferences even according to the aims of
the non-novelty-preferring agent. Novelty in this model means environmental stim-
uli which do not match the agent’s expectations. The authors posit that the intrinsic
desire for novelty promotes learning and thereby goal satisfaction across a variety of
contexts. [23]
2. In the literature on control and motivation in humans, expectation violations are com-
monly taken to be per se aversive. For example, Proulx et al (2012) write: “any given
inconsistency is understood as evoking a common syndrome of aversive arousal”
where inconsistency is defined as any “detected expectancy violation”’. They posit
a general aversive mechanism for both high and low level inconsistencies at least
partly localized to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). [71]
3. Clark (2013) thinks of perceptual systems as functioning primarily to generate and
then minimize prediction errors - i.e. mismatches between expectations and reality.
These systems work in loops of feed-forward and feed-back whereby expectations
are generated, fed down the hierarchy, compared with stimuli and then errors are fed
backwards and used to adjust future predictions and cue attention and other behav-
iors. [26]
Of course, Proulx et al are offering a descriptive account about humans, whereas Singh
et al are offering a normative account about rational preferences in a broad class of agents,
and Clark is doing something in between. But arguably, even the more descriptive accounts
have a normative output; they describe a highly general way of engaging with the world in
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species that perform their cognitive tasks in at least a reasonably sufficient way given their
limitations. Given that, it seems that these positions are potentially in tension.
Based on these research programs, you might be tempted to conclude that agents should
(where “should” is meant in a very weak sense of “would be acting reasonably to”):
1. Search for, and value, novelty
2. Avoid, and disvalue, inconsistency
3. Generate, and then minimize, prediction error
But of course, the catch: the descriptions given of novelty, inconsistency and prediction
error by these authors are incredibly similar, and at times even identical. They are all
violations of expectations. And note that value differences in the stimuli cannot explain
the difference (i.e. good surprises are novel, bad surprises are inconsistent) because all of
these accounts posit that value is coded in response to surprising value-neutral phenomena.
That is, they hold that novelty is per se encoded as positive - or negative. The reason these
accounts assert anything interesting or controversial is because they offer an explanation
for a basic way in which value can be computed.
This disagreement is about the cognitive function of novelty, as well as the rationality
of that function. While it might be theoretically possible to reconcile these accounts, I’ll
instead treat this disagreement as motivation to look at more fine-grained functions for
novelty. That is, if we’ve reached an impasse about the function of novelty in cognition in
general, perhaps it can be resolved by assigning different functions for novelty in different
cognitive modules or subsystems.
4.1.2 Novelty in Memory
As in the work surveyed in the previous section, memory for novelty is usually un-
derstood in terms of expectation mismatch [15] [74]. Further relevant distinctions can be
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drawn to separate a broadly unexpected observation from mismatches between an observa-
tion in a context[14] or in an association[67]; for instance, a chair is not a novel stimulus
in general, but it becomes novel when found in an aquarium, or associated with strong
positive emotion.
When locating novelty processing in the memory system, there are several possible
points in the process of memory that we might be interested in. Following a (somewhat
controversial) convention in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, the processing from
observing an event to later recalling it to mind can be split up as follows in chronological or-
der: encoding, consolidation, retrieval, reconsolidation, retrieval,... with the last two stages
potentially iterating many times. Encoding refers to the initial storage of information. Con-
solidation is the first transfer of information within the memory system, which often results
in changes to the content; temporarily encoded information is moved and combined to be
stored for the longer term. Retrieval involves some of the information stored in memory
becoming available to online cognition. Following retrieval is a process of reconsolidation
which can involve both changes to the retrieved information as well as changes to other
stored information[62]. As each of these stages involve discrete computations, selecting
for novelty could in principle happen at any or all of them - in this section, I will focus
on encoding and (re)consolidation, since these stages have been linked more robustly to
novelty.
Just as in the general cognition case, the psychological literature on novelty in memory
reveals an immediate problem: mismatch is sometimes remembered more than ‘match’[14],
sometimes less [94], and sometimes there seems to be no effect at all[66]. However, this
plausibly reflects differences in the kind of novelty at stake; for instance, Rouhani et al.[78]
found enhanced memory for any reward prediction error regardless of valence. Reward
prediction error refers to a mismatch in how much value obtains in a particular state as op-
posed to other features of that state. In the classification task of identifying novelty which
should be remembered and novelty which can be put aside, features such as high contex-
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tual stakes might suggest that this odd event should be given extra attention, whereas other
features such as the novel observation being only novel in a particularly narrow context,
might instead point to the odd event as an outlier or measurement error that should be de-
emphasized or even forgotten. We seem to be far from a comprehensive answer to this
question. I will mainly focus on the cases of enhanced memory for novelty in order to at
least sketch the known effects within that category.
At the neurobiological level, researchers have uncovered several signatures of novelty-
associated computation. The increased salience of novelty at encoding seems to be mod-
ulated by the neurotransmitter dopamine. For instance, Rangel-Gomez et al. found that
treating humans with the dopamine agonist apomorphine increased the strength of mem-
ories for words written in novel fonts relative to those written in regular fonts. This task
involved testing shortly following the event and correlated with an ERP (event-related po-
tential) previously associated with novelty at the encoding stage[75]. On the other hand,
while dopamine is thought to be enhanced in schizophrenia, Mayer et al. actually found
reduced novelty salience at encoding in schizophrenic patients[61]. Their task involved a
novel upside-down letter ‘A’ compared to a non-novel properly oriented ‘A’. At consolida-
tion, work using fMRI has linked novelty at encoding to increased activity in the medial
temporal lobe, relative to increased cortical activity for non-novel stimuli[92]. Here, a
representative experiment[92] involved a rubber duck in ordinary (bathroom) and novel
(bakery) contexts. As you can see, these three studies used very different stimuli under the
heading of novelty. The sense in which an upside-down ‘A’ is odd is quite different from
how a rubber duck in a bakery is odd. For one, the former is novel in general and the latter
is only novel in the context. And even the relatively small difference between a word in an
unusual font and an upside-down ‘A’ might explain the divergent findings in the first two
dopamine studies.
A key question for novelty processing in memory is how much of what ends up selec-
tively encoded as novel in memory is inherited from other cognitive systems as novel? It
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is safe to assume that at least some observations are passed down in this way, given other
work on close links between working memory and encoding into long term memory. An
object tagged as novel in perception may be recorded as novel in memory without sub-
stantial intervening computation. This suggests three potential categories where novelty
arises in either or both of on-line cognition or memory: (a) observations tagged as novel
by on-line cognition and consequently treated as novel in memory, (b) observations tagged
as novel by on-line cognition but treated neutrally in memory, and (c) observations treated
as neutral on-line but tagged as novel in memory. Category (b) can be given an efficiency
rationale. Murty et al. [66] note a computational trade-off between recording every novel
event that might be salient to reward, or taxing the memory system less and potentially
missing salient cues. In their study, novel stimuli were selectively remembered in only
some environments: namely, those with salient rewards.
Categories (b) and (c) both involve a computation by the memory system, in particu-
lar, (c) requires an active computation to tag new stimuli as novel. Whether these actu-
ally characterize typical computations in the mammalian memory system has not yet been
firmly established. However, the resources required to do such a computation are already
invoked by most theories of consolidation, which appeal to the notion of a schema or sim-
ilar concepts. A schema is something like a script or pattern that is used to encode what
has happened and predict what will happen - for instance, a narrative structure that says
folk stories should have a beginning, crisis point, and then happy ending. A Baba Yaga
story, for example, where the witch Baba Yaga menaces a child but is then dispelled by
a clever trick is schema-consistent. There is a strong consensus that memory processing
involves selection for schema-consistent information, and that this process is ongoing from
encoding to reconsolidation (see McKenzie and Eichenbaum[62] for an example of one
such theory and overview of others). Presumably, if our memory systems have the compu-
tational resources to selectively enhance schema-consistent events and stimuli, these same
process might be modulated to highlight certain schema-inconsistent events and stimuli. Of
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course, we can only speculate at this juncture about what such a computation might look
like, but the evidence for some kind of novelty-sensitivity in memory that I have surveyed
gives us an additional reason to search for memory computations that select for novelty.
In summary, empirical evidence indicates several possible roles for novelty. While
much of the research emphasizes the importance of novelty, large-scale theories disagree
dramatically about how novelty is treated. Research in memory echoes a similar clash,
though features such as risk, reward and scope of expectation seem to modulate the re-
sponse to novelty and possibly provide clues as to how to reconcile the cases where novelty
is more memorable, neutral or less memorable. It is plausible, though far from established,
that memory encoding, consolidation and reconsolidation involve a computation selecting
for novelty, and actively making some novel events especially easy to retrieve.
4.2 A Distinctive Function
In this section, I argue that some possible novelty computations should be thought of
as distinctively memorial operations. That is, computing these functions would consist in
performing a memory operation. Where the previous section motivated a search for this
kind of computation as a biological fact, this section will sketch a theoretical model of the
relevant computations. Here, I distinguish memory operations from on-line operations as
follows: memory operations involve time-scales of days or longer, they do not typically in-
volve conscious attention, and in general concern information storage. In the experimental
setting, memory operations can also be distinguished neurophysiologically, though I will
not take this approach here.
Generating and maintaining anomalous memories is a distinctively memorial operation
given that anomalies in memory have distinct content and distinct roles from anomalies in
attention and on-line cognition. This section makes a conceptual point about the intuitive
category of memory operations, not an empirical point about how we actually compute
these operations; the aim of doing so is just to set up the phenomenon which will be given
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a rational explanation in Section 4.3.
Building on the example in Offensive Question, we should expect anomalous memories
to sometimes have distinct contents from anomalies in on-line cognition. There are two
ways in which such a divergence might occur. Some perceptual anomalies do not make it to
long-term memory as anomalies. For example, a weird splotch that draws visual attention
turns out to be a speck of dust on my glasses, and I do not encode it vividly in memory.
Conversely, some memory anomalies may not be tagged on-line, but instead emerge later.
For example, a normal-seeming sighting of a friend becomes anomalous when I later hear
that he was supposed to be in Bosnia at the time. These two kinds of mismatch in content
between memory and on-line cognition correspond to the categories (b) and (c) from the
previous section.
Considering how anomalies can be used, we can also see a distinction in function be-
tween memory and attention. In Offensive Question. Azadeh holds on to this peculiar
instance, and as a result, examines her future interactions with her friend more closely.
That is, not unlike in the case of our Kuhnian scientist, she is looking for further anomalies
to record and combine together. Unlike in the simplest Kuhnian model where the anoma-
lies just push the community one notch further toward a paradigm shift, in a realistic case,
anomalies need to be remembered as well as processed through the probability distribution
to avoid repeats and to be properly chunked. Realistically, anomalies that perturb a scien-
tific theory will not be an uniform series of events, but belong to clusters and structures
that the agent would benefit from attempting to track. For instance, a series of phenomena
that link time to perspective should be clumped together in order to see how they chal-
lenge the Newtonian paradigm. This process of accumulation followed by sorting would
take place over days, months or even years. Even after the paradigm shift, some of the
anomalous events should be processed again; they need to be assessed on whatever new
theory has arisen. This recursive and temporally-extended memory process applies to the
non-scientific case as well. For instance, once Azadeh comes to understand her friend, she
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will look back on his behavior and re-analyze it under the new theory, seeing his facial
expressions as signifying different emotions and so on.
Thus we can conclude that anomalies could be tracked in memory in order to sort, clus-
ter and recombine them to discern the structure of the underlying phenomena and guide be-
havior. Likewise, anomalies are used to prime and modulate attention over long timescales.
The memory of an unusual event, as in the example, can lead us to seek out new informa-
tion, sometimes by changing behavior and other times by directing attention. This indicates
a role prior to behavior and attention, keeping the anomaly in the background so as to be
able to use it in on-line computations. Of course, long-term guidance of attention requires
more than just memory; my point is that it critically involves memory. In other words,
anomaly in the memory system has a distinct role to play.
As an aside, anomalies may also have distinctive content and roles in the sub-categories
of semantic and episodic memory. Consider the memory for anomalous states ( for ex-
ample, seeing a new configuration of lines) as opposed to anomalous acts (for example,
attempting a new style of dancing). Observations in either category can in principle be
recorded episodically or semantically. This is especially true of anomalous states, since
they can be updated based on information the agent knows without information about where
that knowledge comes from. There may be advantages to each kind of encoding. However,
memory for anomalous acts are different, in that they are most naturally recorded episodi-
cally since they need to be updated based on information about what the agent herself has
done.
4.3 A Rational Function
The preceding portions of this chapter described a behavior of selectively remembering
odd events, using that memory to guide future actions such as searching for more informa-
tion, and so forth. I’ll now argue that this behavior, given the right conditions, underlies
epistemically rational changes in belief. Rather than commit to a theory of rationality, I’ll
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provide reasons to think anomalous memories are rational on several different understand-
ings of rationality. Because anomalous memories as described invoke computation and
processing as opposed to just transitions between beliefs, and most theories of epistemic
rationality concern only beliefs, this section will attempt to sidestep this issue by talking
about the changes in belief that go along with anomalous memories, on the understanding
that there is more to the computation than just a change in belief. In other words, since
computing memory anomalies makes a change to the agent’s model of the world, I will
treat this computation as if it is a behavior consisting of belief formation and revision,
since at the least it has implications for belief formation and revision, as is clear from the
definition of anomalous memories. I’ll now turn to a few sketches of what it means to be
epistemically rational.
4.3.1 Closer to Truth
Some epistemologists are epistemic consequentialists in the following sense: they hold
that change to one’s beliefs is rational if and only if it brings the agent predictably closer to
truth. ‘Predictably’ here can mean several, critically different things; the most obvious of
these are ‘according to the agent’s perspective’, or ‘according to reliable processes’. The
former invokes how things look given the agent’s evidential position, whereas the latter is
sensitive to facts beyond the agent’s view. 1 I will consider both the agent’s perspective
version of consequentialism and the reliablist version in turn.
First, the computation of anomalous memories may seem likely to result in truth from
the agent’s perspective in cases where she believes that holding on to the memory of this
event over time will direct her attention and result in success at eventually getting to the
truth about the event. For instance, Azadeh might think to herself: ‘I can’t figure out what’s
1‘Ex-ante’ is sometimes added to the agent’s perspective to disambiguate two ways of evaluating a change
to one’s beliefs: ex-ante, i.e. before adopting the change, or ex-post, conditional on the change having been
made. Ex-ante and ex-post evaluations can differ in cases where holding a belief either justifies itself, or
undermines itself. For instance, in a case introduced by Jennifer Carr[21], my confidence that I can achieve a
handstand increases my actual capacity to do a handstand. In this case, a belief that I will definitely succeed
at the handstand is ex-post justified, but may not be ex-ante justified.
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going on with my friend right now, but I’ll resist the urge to revise my beliefs and come
back to this later, when I’m more likely to figure out what happened’. She must also judge
that believing the event happened while not following through completely on the inferential
consequences is her best shot at getting things right in the meantime. This may be because
she doubts that any inferential consequences she draws now will be correct, and they might
even interfere with figuring out the puzzle. This version of consequentialism is quite easy
to satisfy, and we need not establish that it will hold for all anomalous memories but only
a subset in order to show that the phenomenon is generally rational in some contexts.
Likewise for the reliablist version. Reliablist are happy for relying on fortune-tellers
and magical oracles to sometimes be rational, so it should not be too hard to establish our
conclusion. Further, the practice of anomalies in science lends support to the idea that
preserving anomalies is a broadly useful process. The fact that we likely carry out this
process as a matter of empirical fact, as I’ve discussed, is another line of evidence that it
likely has some use to us. And the most obvious kind of use of information-management
is to build helpful representations for achieving our goals. Since accuracy is systematically
(though not always) helpful, this provides a reason to suspect that a widespread cognitive
process without any obvious defect may be furthering the accuracy of our representations.
The reliablist might also appeal to work on the temporal dynamics of convergence in group
epistemology. Zollman[99] for instance presents a model on which excessive connectivity
(i.e. information sharing) between individuals leads to overall worse outcomes as compared
to a mild amount of modularization (i.e. partial information segregation). Essentially,
this is because these connected systems converge faster, and so may more likely converge
on the wrong answer and stay there, whereas systems that wait longer to converge are
less likely to converge on the incorrect answer because they have accumulated more total
evidence. Arguably, the same model can be applied to anomalous memories; here the limits
on drawing inferences based on the memory act as barriers to information transfer, and
so the agent who maintains anomalies takes longer (and waits for more evidence) before
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making up her mind about the consequences of what happened. In noisy cases, where the
possibility of false convergence is real, this computation should reliably increase truth over
time relative to a strategy that involves faster reconciliation.
4.3.2 Apt Response to Evidence
To move on to a more substantial claim, I’ll argue that anomalous memories can be
apt responses to evidence. This notion of epistemic rationality, unlike consequentialism, is
backwards-looking in the sense that it demands that beliefs conform to what the agent has
observed rather than what will help her out in the future. By apt, I mean something like
fitting with the current evidence. The central idea is that an apt response is still apt even if
it is useless or even harmful; aptness is purely backward-looking.
Anomalous memories initially seem clearly inapt. Azadeh, by holding back from in-
ferring something about her friend’s character, is resisting what looks like the apt response
to her evidence. But this assumes that aptness is synchronic. The synchronic assumption is
necessary because we’re considering just the aptness of her initial response, as opposed to
the whole trajectory over time. If we instead analyze Azadeh’s trajectory, the series of tran-
sitions is less obviously inapt, because she is in fact conforming her beliefs to the evidence
eventually. She figures out the correct explanation of her friend’s action not by luck or in
spite of her original stance, but because of it, and there’s an evidential story to be told about
how. That is, she comes to see what her evidence supports, and responds by believing in
the way her evidence demands.
This response can only succeed if diachronic evaluations need not be forward-looking.
To see this, consider the difference between a plant growing naturally and a plant grow-
ing successfully. To say it grows naturally is to say that the stages of the process unfold
according to biological regularities; it opens its flowers in response to light waves as a
function of hormonal response, for instance. This is a diachronic evaluation because rather
than talking about snapshots in time and transitions between them, it adverts to temporally-
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extended features of processes. After all, opening flowers in response to light can only be
assessed over the course of a whole day. On the other hand, this is not a forward-looking
evaluation, because it does not determine whether the process is natural based on where it
will end up. By contrast, successful growing, or growing that results in edible fruit, is a
forward-looking evaluation. Rather than the shape of the processes taking place, successful
fruit-bearing is determined by the connection between these processes and the likelihood
of a future end: producing fruit. Insofar as different processes produce the same outcome
(perhaps across various conditions, or enough times), they are evaluated to be equally suc-
cessful - whereas a similar process failing or succeeding to meet the outcome will have a
different evaluation. Further, the distinction still holds if we understand forward-looking
evaluations as being about likelihoods of good outcomes rather than actual good outcomes.
Here, due to a defective environment, one perfectly natural process may predictably lead to
no fruit, whereas the same process in a different environment would likely lead to fruit. So
diachronic does not imply forward-looking.
I’d like to suggest that on a diachronic understanding, anomalous memories are apt
responses to evidence. Like natural growth, they are processes that unfold over time as a
response to the agent’s evidential situation and bring her into conformity with the evidence
as they unfold. I have not argued that synchronic understandings of aptness are wrong, but
they are not the only coherent notions of aptness.
4.3.3 Coherence
Finally, another view of epistemic rationality centers around coherence. Coherence
gets invoked in both the cognitive science and philosophy literatures, often in somewhat
distinct senses. But in both cases, coherence is often thought to be crucial for rationality.
For instance, the psychologist Allison Gopnik writes:
[C]ognitive maps are coherent. Rather than just having particular repre-
sentations of particular spatial relations, cognitive maps allow an animal to
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represent many different possible spatial relations in a generative way. An an-
imal that knows the spatial layout of a maze can use that information to make
new inferences about objects in the maze. [42]
Coherence, for Gopnik, involves being disposed to use what one knows to extend one’s
knowledge to new cases. Already, the case of anomalous memories seems problematic; the
evidential distance in these cases involves hesitance to extend one’s knowledge. Philoso-
phers often appeal to the following distinction to understand coherence:
• Consistency: two representations of the world are consistent if they could possibly
both be true at the same time
• Coherence: two representations of the world are coherent if they could plausibly both
be true at the same time
To make a representation coherent, however, will often involve the kind of response that
Gopnik is describing; when I notice a sense in which I don’t believe the plausible conse-
quences of some of my other beliefs, I have a reason to fix something and often (but not
always) this fixing will involve generating new beliefs. One wrinkle is that coherence is not
necessarily a purely internal matter; we also want our representations to remain coherent
as new information is fed into the system.
As in the previous section, I will not attempt to argue that computing anomalous mem-
ories furthers synchronic coherence. In fact, under both Gopnik’s generative notion and
the more austere criterion of coherence above, anomalous memories start off as markedly
incoherent compared to other available responses such as suspending judgment entirely or
following through on all the consequences of occurrence of the anomalous event. Azadeh
believes that her friend has a certain character, and also that he asked this question. She also
believes that no one with that character would ever ask that question. And so her beliefs
are incoherent, and even inconsistent. Of course, synchronic coherence theories can allow
for some rational incoherence. But synchronic incoherence is only synchronically justified
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by a pure coherence theory if the agent has no other, more coherent option available. For
instance, in the case of a paradox, we have no coherent option at all, and in other cases,
we may have one less incoherent option that is still incoherent. Azadeh’s case fits neither
paradigm, because the options of suspending judgment about her friend’s character, the
question itself, or both are available to her and more coherent. I’ll argue in spite of this that
anomalous memories do increase diachronic coherence, sometimes uniquely.
Diachronic coherence can be thought of in three ways: as eventual coherence, aggre-
gate coherence, and true diachronic coherence. Eventual coherence is about where you
end up, whereas aggregate coherence weights coherence at some or all times and adds it
together. True diachronic coherence does not weight any one time, but describes the tempo-
rally extended process. In fact, we’ve already seen a version of true diachronic coherence;
diachronic aptness is a way of diachronically achieving coherence between one’s beliefs
and one’s evidence. Aggregate coherence is interesting but since there are uncountable
ways of aggregating, I’ll focus on eventual coherence. Eventual coherence represents a
middle ground between the previous two conceptions of rationality: it is outcome-focused,
like consequentialism, but appeals to notions of fit, like aptness, since coherence is a kind
of fit with the world.
Anomalous memories are rational, under rationality-as-eventual-coherence. Compare
the possible end-points in Azadeh’s situation:
1. The original case: she comes to see her friend’s behavior for what it was, a response
to a problematic dynamic in the Q&A
2. Suspension: she decides to suspend judgment about her friend’s behavior initially,
and never finds out more since the subject is out of her mind2.
3. Commitment: she takes the evidence of the Offensive Question as decisive, judges
2Suspension here should be distinguished from lack of belief; since she is already considering the propo-
sition, I will leave aside the option of never forming any attitude at all to her friend’s behavior, which most
naturally occurs in cases where we do not even consider some proposition.
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her friend’s character to be worse for it, and never finds out more since she spends
less time with him.
If these were the three most plausible outcomes, it would follow that Azadeh’s actual re-
sponse does the best at eventual coherence. This is because both of the other two cases
leave Azadeh open to being confronted with further evidence if she encounters her friend,
and so being incoherent, or of encountering other facts that depend on the truth of the situa-
tion, which would be incoherent with her beliefs. Alternately, her beliefs would not end up
being coherent if she actually does have some information that conflicts with her judgments
of her friends character; that is, it might be possible to determine the problematic dynamic
of the Q&A from the evidence she already has, if she were more discerning or motivated
to uncover the truth. In this case, she is already incoherent, but in a way that is inaccessible
to her.
This all may seem rather cheap. After all, many kinds of peculiar, patently irrational
processes might end up with a coherent outcome - why should that tell us anything about
their rationality? The key here is not that Azadeh ends up in a good place, but that she
avoids ending up in a bad place. Her evidential situation at the beginning of the story is
not ideal nor is her ability to discern alternative possibilities. Likewise, Kuhn’s scientist
before Newton is in a difficult position; she is starting to notice things that don’t fit with
her current theory, but is unable to come up with an alternative. In these cases, the familiar,
synchronically coherent response leads to eventual incoherence. So anomalous memories
may be rational because they are one of the only plausible solutions to these difficult prob-
lems. This is a preliminary indication that anomalous memories are not just rational, but
distinctively rational; they represent a way of being rational (stepping away from coherence
now to achieve coherence later) that differs structurally from many paradigmatic rational
changes in belief.
In conclusion, this section established that under some but not all views of rational-
ity, anomalous memories are epistemically rational. The views that sanction anomalous
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Figure 4.1: An exhibit from the Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Moscow, depicting the siege
of Leningrad.
memories are both consequentialist and deontological, synchronic as well as diachronic.
4.4 Upshots, and a Metaphor
In Figure 4.1, you can see a characteristic exhibit from the Central Museum of the Great
Patriotic War in Moscow . As you might infer from the name, this museum commemorates
World War II; housed behind and underneath, a giant obelisk, it presents artifacts and de-
pictions of battles and diplomatic relations during the war. These exhibits promote a single,
perfectly coherent vision of what happened, why it happened, and who was to blame. In
diorama after diorama, peasants with earnest expressions and beautiful faces fight masked
German soldiers arranged in exacting military formations and armed with weapons that cast
dark shadows. In other work, I use the metaphor of a museum to describe the distinctive
role of the memory system in generating knowledge - here, I’d like to point to the example
of this war museum to show the dangers of a memory system that does not generate and
maintain anomalies even if it gets things right. If I tell myself the story of my past in such a
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Figure 4.2: An online exhibit highlights the puzzles surrounding the fall of the city of Teotihuacan,
and draws attention to a reconstructed artifact (right) which was apparently broken up
into many pieces and deliberately separated across many disparate locations
perfectly coherent narrative, I am handicapped in the same way as visitors who only learn
the version of history from the Patriotic War Museum. That is, if the story is in any way
inaccurate, it is now very difficult for the visitors to see the flaws, and to adapt the story
once the flaws have been noted. Even if the story is accurate, the viewer is not able to argue
for its accuracy or discern possible weaknesses that need to be defended. This museum
is not only a disservice to the facts currently at our disposal, but it has made itself nearly
useless for the future when further facts might come to light.
Conversely, consider the value of a museum that presents, and highlights, artifacts and
information that don’t comfortably fit into the prevailing explanation, or even any explana-
tion. For instance, the exhibit on the fall of Teotihuacan in Figure 4.2 highlights a statue
that was for some unknown reason broken up into many pieces and distributed all across
the city. This kind of museum invites visitors to entertain doubts about the prevailing ex-
planation, and can serve as a hint that allows us to peel away the mistaken narrative and
see a way forward to a new possibility. This mirrors both the justification I’ve given for
anomalous memories and the Kuhnian theory of scientific revolution. As I’ve argued here,
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memory plays a significant and irreducible role in this story.
Epistemology and scientific theories of rational cognition often focus on how we com-
bine premises to draw inferences, bring together pieces of evidence to support conclusions,
and various other instances of information synthesis. While the projects grouped under this
heading differ in a myriad of significant ways, they are all ways of engaging in a broader
project of studying how we combine information into a coherent whole. The contrast case
is the study of how we separate out evidence, differentiate between theories, and under-
stand experiences as anomalies, outliers or surprises. Understanding memory anomalies is
a small part of the latter project, the contours of which I’ve begun to explore here.
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CHAPTER V
Belief, and its Fraying Edges
ABSTRACT. This chapter considers memories of events and facts that in some sense
look like beliefs about those events and facts, but on the other hand deviate from the content
and function typically associated with belief. I use these belief-like memories to raise a
challenge for the idea that belief is a natural category of mental state with well-defined
boundaries. An alternative view, which has its roots in medieval theories of cognition,
treats the category of belief as a small and fuzzy region in a larger, more complex space.
This space is characterized by, on the one axis, degrees and types of conceptualization,
and on the other, degrees and types of cognitive commitment. Returning to this classical
picture of mental representations that we take as true gives us a better explanation of the
wide range of states found in memory.
5.1 Introduction
Do you believe everything you remember? “I remember Tehran is the capital of Iran”
seems to imply that I believe Tehran is the capital of Iran, but on the other hand, my dis-
tant memory that links the Constitutional Revolution to something about the 19th century
fatwah against tobacco seems too vague to qualify as a belief. So what is the right way to
characterize memories which are not beliefs, or not exactly beliefs? Can these belief-like
states be held rationally, and used to guide rational action? These questions concern the
intersection between two areas of philosophical inquiry: the taxonomy of cognitive states,
and the rational evaluability of our mental lives.
In this chapter, I first discuss a series of cases of memories that are hard to classify in
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relation to belief, starting with the case of anomalous memory from the previous chapter. I
then discuss recent work by Andy Egan, Agustin Rayo and Adam Elga, and Robert Audi
on belief-like states that are not clearly belief, using this discussion to make the case that
these intermediate states raise some interesting questions for how to think of the attitudes
we use to represent the world around us. These recent projects are interesting, but do
not fully answer these questions. To get closer to an answer, I turn to a medieval theory
of mental representations that does not center on belief. This account is drawn from the
classical Islamic philosopher Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, who developed a distinction between
conceptualization and assent. This distinction allows us to understand the relationship
between all kinds of memory states and what we now think of as paradigmatic belief. As
opposed to contemporary views which define belief-like states in terms of their deviation
from belief, Al-Farabi’s model systematizes a rich space of representational states of which
paradigmatic belief is just a small region. In moving away from the belief-centric model,
belief-like states can be understood in their own right as rational or irrational, as opposed
to merely defective beliefs. Thus, this chapter makes a preliminary case for a return to an
older, more pluralistic theory of what it means to take something to be true.
5.2 Belief-like Memory
The aim of this section is to bring to life cases of memories which are not exactly be-
liefs - but not obviously a wholly different state either. These cases are intended to be
intuitively recognizable, and to represent several general types. However, instead of pure
phenomenology, I intend to appeal to a common sense reconstruction of what is going on
behind the scenes when we experience the (hopefully familiar) phenomenology of remem-
bering.
Rather than rely on a theory of belief and argue that these cases don’t fit such a theory,
I’ll rely on the reader’s intuitive sense of what a belief is and how it behaves. For instance,
consider the ordinary way I believe that it rained yesterday: I have a representation of the
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rain falling on my glasses, I would say that it rained if asked, the rain fits into my narrative
of yesterday’s events, I would not be surprised to discover my sneakers are still wet this
morning, and so on.
This commonsense function of belief can be split into three components:
1. Beliefs are formed, sustained, and revised in response to evidence
2. Beliefs guide action, including assertion
3. Beliefs guide thought, including inference and attention
By guiding action and thought, I mean that belief is involved in guidance, along with
other states such as desire. I will assume that in at least in some cases, I don’t infer my
belief that some event occurred from the fact that I remember it (i.e. I don’t compute
an additional belief representation on top of my memory representation), but rather my
believing that it rained consists in my memory that it rained1. For simplicity, in the chapter
I will not delve into the issue of occurrent versus dispositional belief. I’ll treat belief as the
mental state which performs whatever we take to be the commonsense function, a state that
you can be in even when not explicitly considering the content of the belief.
Consider the following case:
Offensive Question: At a talk, a friend of mine who is kind and even-
tempered asked very aggressively why the speaker employed such a terrible
methodology. At the time, I thought to myself “I can’t possibly imagine what
he was thinking! There’s no judgment that I could make about a talk that would
lead me to ask that kind of question!”’. This incident stuck in my mind long
after I had forgotten all the other questions at that particular talk. But I did not
revise my judgment about my friend’s character - instead, I felt uneasy about
what had happened and regarded it as an unexplained fluke.
1This is of course not entirely uncontroversial - Sellars[80], for instance, holds that all perception involves
inference, and the parallel position in the case of memory would be incompatible with the gloss I have just
provided. However, for my purposes, it is sufficient that memory representations encode a picture of the
world, and so the question can arise: are these always beliefs, and if not, what are they?
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Later, my friend and I talked about what happened, and I came to understand what had
upset him, and that he needed to publicly register his disagreement in order to demonstrate
that the speaker did not speak on his behalf. But my attitude from the time of the talk to
the time of our later discussion can be characterized in the following way: I remembered
what had happened, but did not incorporate the evidence furnished by the incident into my
other beliefs about my friend’s character. That is, in ruminating about how offensive my
friend’s question was, I seemed to believe that the event occurred. However, by resisting
following this thought out to its logical conclusion and reducing my confidence in his moral
character, I seemed to not really believe. I’ll refer to memories that we treat in this way as
anomalous memories; these memories are distinguished by their evidential attitude in the
following way:
Anomalous memories: A memory M of event P is treated as an anomaly
when the agent singles it out for selective consolidation and attention based in
part on the fact that P is surprising, unlikely or odd, and when the agent is at
least sometimes not disposed to draw inferences based on M because of P’s
oddness.
This evidential attitude of partial distancing may be rational in some cases. In Offensive
Question, keeping the odd experience in the back of my mind allowed me to understand
what happened later. These cases of anomalous memory parallel more familiar ones in the
philosophy of science notably described by Kuhn as anomalies, such as the scientific focus
on, and distance from, the phenomenon of the procession of the perihelion of Mercury in
Newtonian physics. Our token Newtonian physicist was preoccupied by the procession
of the perihelion, kept it in mind over time, but did not follow through on the inferences
that would normally be licensed by a piece of evidence that is inconsistent with our best
theory. That is, the scientist neither discounted the anomaly nor reduced her confidence in
Newtonian physics.
To move beyond anomalous memories, here is a limited series of other types of memo-
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ries that fit uneasily into the category of belief:
• Distant memories: Memories that are only triggered by a very specific, and not
particularly informative cue. (e.g. Proust’s childhood memory of being lost and
locating himself finallly by a glimpse of the church steeple is triggered by the taste
of a madeleine, and moving through a series of other recollections first. Were he to
be asked, in another context, if had ever used the church steeple for navigation, he
might have said ‘no’.)
• Fragile memories: Memories that, once recalled, would be rejected as false. (e.g. I
have a memory with the content ‘walking without slippers gives you the flu’. How-
ever, once I call to mind this fact, it’s immediately obvious that I believe this to be
false, since I consider it a folk superstition.)
• Recalcitrant memories: Memories that are both accurate in their first-order content,
and known to be confabulated (e.g. I seem to remember my brother’s bris, but I know
that this memory was actually formed after hearing my father describing the event in
great detail, and contains many details that I would not have actually noticed at that
age. )
• Thin memories: Memories which are extremely information-poor, requiring the de-
tails to be filled in with effort and background information (e.g. I have a sketchy
memory of a trip I took as a child, but the only way to recognize the event and string
the fragments into a narrative is to think very hard about where I could have been,
who would have been there, and so on. )
• De-contextualized memories: Memories which seem to consist solely in a feeling or
sensation, as opposed to an event or proposition (e.g. I have a memory of happiness
but cannot remember why or what about, or a memory of a geometrical figure without
any idea of whether I saw it or thought it up. )
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This taxonomy is incomplete, but hopefully gives the reader a sense of the range of mem-
ory phenomena beyond the paradigmatic cases. Note also that switching from full belief
to partial belief or credence does not alleviate the tension here; like full belief, credence
pictures typically operate with a restricted sense of what a 0.6 credence is, what kind of
evidence forms it, and what kinds of behaviors it licenses. This means that there is a func-
tional profile in common between all credences that I hold to the same degree, whereas the
phenomena I just noted could describe five different ways of treating the same proposition.
Thus, these differences cannot be explained by appealing to degrees of belief.
5.3 The Problem, and Some Partial Solutions
Memories are not the only cognitive states that fall in between belief and something
else. Imagination, consideration, guessing, and implicit attitudes have all been sometimes
identified as belief-like but not quite belief. While I don’t have space here to discuss these
states at length, I will discuss the difference between the memory cases above and the case
of monothematic delusions, using the example of the Capgras delusion, which has been
treated at some length by philosophers.
In the Capgras delusion, a patient sees a familiar person but comes to suspect that they
are an imposter, the true familiar person having been replaced through some conspiracy. A
popular theory about this delusion holds that it is caused by the ability to identify faces,
coupled with the inability to associate faces with affective responses. When the familiar
face does not lead to the usual affective response, perhaps including the cuing of episodic
details, the patient confabulates a story about the changed identity of the familiar person to
explain the mismatch. While the Capgras patient in some sense believes that the person has
been replaced, this view is not formed rationally, and does not lead them to take consistent
rational action. Instead, they typically switch between acting under the delusion, and as
if it were false, and rarely entertain the obvious thought: what if I’m being paranoid? In
only a small percentage of cases does the patient resort to taking actions to unmask the ‘in-
97
truder’, and they tend to report the delusion only sporadically[83]. Some researchers have
attempted to rationalize these responses as a result of a defective percept or a shift in the
patient’s prior probabilities. However, given that the majority of Capgras cases occur in the
setting of a chronic psychiatric disorder (typically schizophrenia)[29][36], the default the-
ory for at least this subset of the cases can reasonably appeal to defects in thought patterns.
V.S. Ramachandran notably provided an explanation that both emphasizes the bizarre na-
ture of this delusion and shows how it is somewhat continuous with normal cognition[73].
I discuss the Capgras delusion here to raise an additional explanatory challenge. Both
the Capgras delusion and anomalous memories are states that resemble belief but do not
share all of its features; the Capgras delusion is formed through a peculiar process and is
inconsistently held as well as resistent to counter-evidence, where anomalous memories are
resistant to incorporation in many inferences, and lead the subject to dwell on them beyond
the ordinary. However, the Capgras delusion is manifestly irrational, whereas anomalous
memories are at least plausibly not irrational. If the parallel with anomalies in scientific
practice is correct, this memory phenomenon may even be a core part of rational change of
view.
The possibility of belief-like states like anomalous memories and the Capgras delusion
raises a series of challenges for traditional accounts of belief. In this section, I’ll intro-
duce these challenges through discussing several projects that focus on different belief-like
states. These projects are Agustin Rayo and Adam Elga’s fragmentation view, Andy Egan’s
theory of bimagination, and Robert Audi’s account of dispositions to believe.
On the fragmentation view, the ordinary category of belief is understood as having an
asterisk. I believe that it will rain on Sunday relative to a certain purpose or query - for
instance, for the purposes of planning my week. Elga and Rayo introduce this notion to
capture cases like distant belief, and especially those with an asymmetry in cues. In one of
their examples, I have a hard time identifying an English word that ends with ‘mt’, while
it’s easy to identify what the last two letters in ‘dreamt’ are. This asymmetry shows that it
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would be missing something to flatly assert that I believe that ‘mt’ are the last two letters in
‘dreamt’. Rather, for one purpose (or to answer one question) I believe it, and for another,
I don’t.
This kind of asymmetry motivates Elga and Rayo’s picture because it is both ubiquitous
and puzzling on our ordinary understanding of belief. It is ubiquitous because most things
we believe are not accessible relative to all purposes. The asymmetry is puzzling because
it is not explained by our familiar accounts of the nature of belief, nor by folk psychology;
on most views, as in the intuitive gloss provided above, belief is an attitude towards a
proposition that the agent either has or fails to have. Of course, there is nothing intrinsically
suspicious about cases that are similar to but not quite belief. But I take it that Rayo and
Elga want the fragmentation cases to be explained somehow, and so folding them into the
category of belief is especially parsimonious.
To relate fragmentation to the memory phenomena I’ve been discussing, Elga and
Rayo’s cases are essentially of the same kind as distant memories - accessing the content is
dependent on a cue. The other memory types I described cannot be assimilated under this
view. Fragile memories, for instance, are not believed relative to any cue, since once cued,
they would be rejected. In summary, Elga and Rayo’s account responds to this problem of
belief-like states by enlarging the category of belief. The result is that one of the memory
cases now counts as belief, but the others still remain in the belief-like category.
Andy Egan argues for the existence of ‘bimagination’, states between belief and imag-
ination, to deal with the Capgras delusion. His argument precedes in part by appealing
to fragmentation. If the category of belief is already so heterogenous as fragmentation
demonstrates, why not posit intermediate states between belief and imagination? That is,
fragmentation shows that the dispositions involved in believing can be active in a limited
setting, relative to a purpose. And Egan will exploit this feature to argue that the notion of
being belief-like but not belief is natural. He describes the alternatives as follows:
“On the restrictive view, there are only a few roles available - there are a small
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number of representation-types, corresponding to the standard propositional
attitudes or something like them, and every representation of a given type has
the same functional profile. On the permissive view, there are very many roles
available - particular representations might play any of a number of different
functional roles in a subject’s cognitive economy, some of which might look
very different from those that fit nicely with the standard propositional atti-
tudes. ” [37]
In the paper, he advocates for the permissive view of mental attitudes. As is clear from the
passage, the heterogeneity within the category of belief supports the characterization of the
category itself as porous. This point will be critical for my purposes here.
What is bimagination? Egan presents this mixed state through a metaphor of two li-
braries. In one library, books are organized into fiction and non-fiction, whereas in the
other, the books are tagged with various more complicated tags. In the latter library, users
are not as sensitive to the fiction/non-fiction distinction, and may use some of the fiction
books occasionally in a way typical of non-fiction, and vice versa - as well as in ways
that are not sensitive to the distinction at all. Thus, on his view, belief and imagination
are two attitudes held toward the same type of content, a representation of a proposition
(or, in the metaphor, a book). The attitudes differ from one another in the use they make
of those representations, and in each case, these uses are clusters containing a variety of
roles. Bimagination is a case where a representation is used sometimes like imagination
and sometimes like belief; since the roles are clusters over time, it’s possible to mix and
match between some from each cluster at each time or context. He concludes that the
Capgras delusion and other monothematic delusions are cases of bimagination.
Egan’s view is just designed to treat the intermediate states between belief and imag-
ination, so it has nothing direct to say about the memory cases. While it makes room for
intermediate states between all kinds of cognitive attitudes, these memories don’t seem to
be between belief and some other familiar cognitive state like imagination.
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Motivated by cases in which, for instance, I don’t already represent the solution to a
math problem but I could easily derive it if asked, Robert Audi[4] proposes that the category
of dispositions to believe can usefully capture some belief-like states. He distinguishes
a dispositional belief, which is stored somewhere in the agent’s cognitive system, and a
disposition to believe, which is the propensity to form such an encoded representation.
Though a disposition to believe that 8.13492 is greater than 8 is not directly stored in the
memory system, we can ascribe the disposition in virtue of what is actually stored, and
how the agent tends to act. Dispositions to believe can be conditional on the context, and
range in strength and persistence. For instance, compare two math problems, one that is far
easier to solve.
Audi differs from both Elga and Rayo, and Egan when it comes to the rationality of
states in question. Egan takes bimagination to be irrational, and Elga and Rayo do not
discuss the rationality of fragmented states directly but treat them as resulting from a lim-
itation in the agent’s ability to disperse information. As such, they may not be irrational,
but are less ideal than non-fragmented states. Audi, on the other hand, writes:
“[D]ispositions to believe admit of justification...Note that, at least usually, the
grounds of a disposition to believe are internally accessible: S usually can, by
reflection, become aware of the crucuial base properties and can often come
to know on what ground S is disposed to believe that p. Thus insofar as the
grounds are good, one can (normally) use them to justify the disposition or, if
they are deficient, to criticize it”[4].
Thus dispositions to believe can be rational or irrational in the ordinary epistemic sense,
and without reference to a failure or limitation on the part of the agent.
Audi’s view handles distant memories neatly; in those cases, Proust is disposed to be-
lieve that he navigated by the church steeple given that he tastes the madeleine, just as a
glass is disposed to shatter given that it undergoes a change in temperature. Likewise, thin
memories can be thought of as weaker dispositions to believe, just like my disposition to
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believe in the answer to the math problem when the problem is quite difficult. The other
cases, like anomalous or recalcitrant memories, seem harder to capture under the heading
of dispositions to believe, though of course they can most likely be assimilated into the
category of dispositions to think.
Overall, these three accounts are preoccupied with the same problem with which I
started this paper; what to do with belief-like states? Elga and Rayo’s response broadens
the category of belief, whereas Egan and Audi both look for a notion related to belief but
outside of it. However, these accounts don’t help us with most of the cases of belief-like
memory. This is not a reason to reject them per se, but gives us a reason to look further for
a theory which will help us understand the relationship between belief-like memories and
paradigmatic belief, both descriptively and normatively. Ideally, this will explain why the
case of anomalous memory is rational and the Capgras delusion is not.
5.4 The Al-Farabian View
Where should we look for an explanation of the remaining cases? One feature that
seems relevant and unexplained in decontextualized and anomalous memories has to do
with a deviation in content, rather than attitude. That is, these states differ from belief in
how they represent the world, not just under what conditions they represent the world.
Of course, the attitudes we adopt and the contents towards which our attitudes are
directed are not separable. As Gareth Evans put it: “Why does the investigation of the
requirements for thoughts and judgement about particular individuals matter? It matters
because the concept of thought about an individual is tied to the concept of understanding
a statement about an individual.” (p92)[38] I take this passage to imply that what it means to
have a thought with this object as its content should be understood in connection with what
we do with such thoughts: namely, we aim to understand statements about their objects. In
this section, I’ll propose a view of belief-like states that factors these states into attitudes
and contents. However, I start with this caveat; while I’ll argue that it is explanatorily
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advantageous to separate the two questions, they should in the end be thought of as bound
together.
Consider this passage from the medieval philosopher Al-Farabi’s commentary on Aris-
totle’s Posterior Analytics:
The term “knowing” occurs in a sentence with two meanings - one is “as-
senting”; the other is “conceptualizing.”....Perfect assent is certainty. Perfect
conceptualization is to conceptualize something by means of a concise account
of what it is in a manner proper to it, because conceptualizing something by
means of what signifies it is to define the thing.... Assent may apply both to
what is true as well as to what is false. Assent may be certain, it may be approx-
imately certain, it may be the assent that is called“the acquiescence of the soul”
with respect to something (which is the one most removed from certainty), and,
there is nothing certain whatsoever in false assent. (Kitab al-Burhan)
While introduced in a commentary, this distinction is original to Al-Farabi, and will go
on to become a widely-used tool in the classical Islamic tradition[13]. I take Al-Farabi to be
describing the space of what we now think of as doxastic states2; while he starts the quote
by talking about knowledge, it’s clear that many of the instances (such as false assent) are
not factive, and so would not be covered by current theories of knowledge. This space of
doxastic states is distinguished by two parameters, conceptualization and assent:
• Conceptualization: In what way does your representation pick out its object?
• Assent: In what way do you take the representation to be true?
Al-Farabi later writes that assent generally “is for a person to believe concerning a thing
about which he makes a judgement that it is, in its existence outside the mind, just as it is
believed to be in the mind”. How can this description fit a range of attitudes, from certitude
2I’ll use ‘doxastic’ to refer to belief and its neighboring representational states
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to the acquiescence of the soul? My reading is that assent refers to how we take something
to be true. This covers not only differences in degree - taking one representation to be
more certain than another - but qualitative differences like taking something to be true in a
restricted context or for a short time.
This might seem like a permissive reading, given that the paradigm case of assent is cer-
tain knowledge. However, there is precedent, at least in the work of Al-Farabi’s followers,
for taking assent to cover a wide variety of states. For instance, Deborah Black provides
the following description of Avicenna’s theory of imagination:
According to Avicenna, all syllogistic arts aim at producing assent to the con-
tent of the propositions that form their conclusions, that is, they aim at causing
belief in the truth of propositions, according to a variety of degrees of convic-
tion. However, in the case of poetic, and only poetic, syllogisms, Avicenna
notes that assent itself is not sought as an end. Rather, the poet utilizes a sub-
stitute for assent, namely, the production of an act of the imaginative faculty
(takhyil) which ‘follows the course of what is assented to, due to an impression
(ta’thir) of it in the soul, this impression in some way taking the place of what
causes assent to occur’[13]
While Avicenna extends the concept of assent to states that do not seek out truth, I’ll
restrict my discussion in this paper to assent which is in some way part of truth-directed
inquiry.
Both conceptualization and assent in degrees, and vary beyond just in degree. A precise
definition is more conceptualized than a loose sketch, and a deep-seated belief is assented
to more fully than a temporary acceptance. However, to expand a little on the text, it’s
unlikely that these parameters are exhausted by a series of degrees: that is, two loose
definitions can be differently conceptualized while still being conceptualized to the same
degree. One definition might only include what algae looks like, whereas the other might
only include where it can be found. Likewise, I might weakly assent to two propositions,
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but in different ways, if I’m disposed to use one in assertion but not other action, and the
other in other action but not assertion.
An obstacle for this distinction to be applied to belief and other doxastic states is that
we now think of these as states. This metaphysical distinction between state and act carries
some weight; distinguishing judgment, which is the act that usually results in the formation
of a belief, from belief itself allows us to maintain that not all beliefs are formed by an
act. Some beliefs, such as the implicit belief that the world does not rest on the back
of an elephant, exist in virtue of our other beliefs and have no clear point of origin. Al-
Farabi, on the other hand, primarily describes assent and conceptualization as acts, though
by classifying them as kinds of knowing, comes closer to describing them as states3.
I’ll pass over the interesting question of why the sharp state/act distinction that we
are now familiar with was not emphasized in the works of Al-Farabi to the same degree.
Instead, we can make Al-Farabi’s view more amenable to contemporary discussion by sep-
arating the state from the act which typically brings it about, in both the case of concep-
tualization and assent. I’ll adopt ’representation-formation’ and ‘assent’ to refer to the
acts, and ’conceptualization’ and ‘commitment’ to refer to the respective states. Critically,
states that involve conceptualization and commitment need not have arisen from acts of
representation-formation and assent. Since conceptualization and commitment are merely
features of a jointly constituted state towards some content, this move raises significant
questions about whether two separate acts typically bring about such a state. I will not
attempt to answer these questions here. So we can modify the original sketch to avoid this
issue:
• Conceptualization: in what way does your representation present its object?
• Commitment: What behaviors (mental or otherwise) are you committed to in relation
to that representation?
3As a historical note, Kant also treats assent as fundamental relative to belief[24]
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This commitment may be understood as an intrinsic feature of the representation. For
instance, by having just the representation of a desire for an apple, I already ‘ought’ in
some weak sense to take steps to acquire an apple. This is not because I have decided to
follow through on my desire, or otherwise formed a higher-order attitude toward it, but
merely because of what it means to represent the apple as the object of desire.
The Al-Farabian view characterizes a wide range of states, classifying them according
to the two parameters. Within this space, we can pick out regions that fit folk psycho-
logical categories such as paradigmatic belief, and paradigmatic imagination. But we can
also situate the memory phenomenon from the first section; some of these involve less
conceptualization than paradigmatic belief, others a different kind of commitment. I’ll go
through the list in detail in the next section. In addition to these case, the Al-Farabian view
neatly captures the difference between the way I believe that string theory is false, and
the way that my friend Chip, a philosopher of physics, believes that string theory is false.
This difference in conceptualization between my belief and Chip’s belief is vast, and has
consequences for how we draw inferences and update our belief over time.
This observation is a clue that while the two parameters are detachable, they are by no
means independent. That is, it seems that an arbitrary level of conceptualization is compat-
ible with any level of assent. By detachable, I mean that it’s in principle possible to firmly
hold something you don’t represent in very much detail, or to vividly entertain a possi-
bility that you only grudgingly accept. On the other hand, assent may demand increased
conceptualization, and increased conceptualization might make assent more reasonable. A
stronger view of this connection is exemplified by Descartes, for instance, who takes the
liveliness (degree of conceptualization) of a representation to tell us something directly
about its accuracy. On Descartes’ view, conceptualization makes commitment rational.
Alternately, there might be a descriptive connection between commitment and conceptual-
ization, rather than or along with a normative one. Eric Madelbaum[60], for instance, holds
that vividly imagining entails belief. In Al-Farabi’s terms, this amounts to conceptualiza-
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tion entailing commitment.
In summary, the Al-Farabian view treats beliefs, and other mental states such as mem-
ory, consideration and guesses, as characterized along the two axes of commitment and
conceptualization. This is a complex space, not neatly divisible into kinds separated by
gaps. On this view, belief is not a natural or special kind, but merely a term we use for
a fuzzily defined region of this space. This picture might seem messy and disorganized;
after all, don’t we rely on the category of belief for all kinds of philosophical purposes?
I’ll return to this question in more depth later, but for now it’s relevant to note that secure
knowledge plays the unifying role in Al-Farabi’s system.
5.4.1 Conceptualization and Generality
It’s now unremarkable to find an entire paper on belief that concerns the ‘belief that
P ’, focusing in rich detail on the attitude of belief while avoiding the issue of the content
P and how it is represented. However, conceptualization has not entirely dropped out
of the contemporary literature on doxastic attitudes. Conceptualization shows up most
obviously in discussions of reference and what it takes to have a thought about an object.
One relevant debate concerns what is called the generality constraint, roughly the idea that
having a thought that some object has some property involves two separable capacities; the
capacity to entertain thoughts about a wide range of objects having that property, and to
think thoughts about about that object having a wide range of properties. This constraint
has been alternately proposed as a requirement on conceptual thought, or even thought in
general. For my purposes, it is also a claim about conceptualization, and most interestingly
about what conceptualizing one thought tells us about the thinker’s ability to conceptualize
others.
The generality constraint was first formally proposed by Evans[38], who attributes it
to Bertrand Russell’s idea that succeeding in thinking ‘the cat is fat’ implies an ability to
differentiate other things from cats, and other properties from fatness. Evans’ version of
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the constraint seems to treat properties and objects equally, though Dickie[31] argues that a
version of the constraint that treats them differently is more true to the original motivation.
In particular, she holds that when we think about an ordinary material object, we’re in a
position to grasp what it would be like for it to have a whole cluster of properties. This type
of generality is more fundamental, though not fully general since it only applies to ordinary
objects and only invokes the capacity to think about some range of properties as opposed
to every property in the thinker’s conceptual repertoire. Generality across different objects
having the property in question is even more limited; when we think ’a is F’, we can’t
necessarily think ’b is F’ but only: ’a is an instance of a kind A, of which other members
may or may not be F’.
The generality constraint presents a challenge for the Al-Farabian account. Al-Farabi’s
view assigns degrees and kinds of conceptualization to individual representations. Implicit
in this approach is the idea that the degree and kind of conceptualization can vary widely
even among related representations held by the same thinker. The generality constraint, on
the other hand, says that in order to think the thought ‘a is F’, you need to be in a position
to conceptualize a wide range of other thoughts. That is, this principle takes the conceptu-
alization of a single thought and infers features about many other potential thoughts. Such
an inference should not intuitively be possible if there were indeed a high degree of inde-
pendence between conceptualization of different representations. Or rather, it should not
be possible unless the property being inferred were trivial or not particularly significant
for conceptualization overall. A related problem is that the generality constraint treats the
ability to think a thought as categorical, as opposed to graded.
I’ll consider two responses to this challenge, the second more successful than the first.
First, we might maintain that the belief-like representations under discussion are not con-
ceptual, or not fully conceptual, and as such are not subject to the generality constraint.
If we take generality to govern conceptual thought, then this would mean ascribing some
cases of imperfect conceptualization to non-conceptual thought. Jacob Beck[8], on similar
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lines, argues that not all non-general kinds of thought are perceptual, using the example
of analog magnitudes. In short, analogue magnitudes are representations of number and
amount that are cognized quickly and in a different form than more explicit numerical rep-
resentations. Since analog magnitudes don’t recombine in the way required by generality,
Beck concludes that they are non-conceptual. Though the same thing could in principle be
said of less-conceptualized representations, it would take these representations into a differ-
ent cognitive category than more fully conceptualized ones. That is, the division between
conceptual and non-conceptual content is typically taken to extend to a division in kinds
of processing; for instance, on Christopher Peacocke’s[68] model, early non-conceptual
perceptual processing feeds into conceptual thought, and so the two kinds of content map
on to two stages of thinking. This result would be unfortunate for the Al-Farabian view,
since it both imposes a categorical cut-off, and makes this cut-off crucial for the roles of
the thoughts in question. By doing so, it violates the separability claim.
More promisingly, Al-Farabi might maintain that despite appearances, the generality
constraint is actually graded - and that this gradation reveals that the most reasonable ver-
sion of the constraint is too trivial to threaten the Al-Farabian account. Elisabeth Camp[19]
notes that while advocates of generality limit the constraint to avoid saying that the thinker
can entertain thoughts like “Caesar is a prime number”, we all manage to understand lit-
erary sentences such as “life’s but a walking shadow”. She argues that the best version of
the generality constraint says that if I can entertain thoughts about Caesar, and thoughts
about prime number, I should in fact be able to think that Caesar is a prime number. Of
course, I will not be able draw very many inferences from this thought, as compared to
the thought that 7 is a prime number. But I will be able to get something out of it, as is
clear in the case of more usual metaphors. Camp accepts that there is less sense, and less
inferential function, to this thought. Her conclusion is that the generality constraint holds
in its strongest form, without exceptions - but it prescribes a minimal ability to entertain a
thought. On this gloss, the tension between generality and the Al-Farabian view dissolves,
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since the Al-Farabian can concede that the wide range of thoughts meets the low standard
of generality but within this range there are crucial differences with respect to how much
sense the thoughts will make, and whether the thinker can firmly entertain them.
This second response allows the generality constraint and the Al-Farabian view to co-
exist. It can be bolstered even further by noting that the generality constraint entails mere
capacities to conceptualize, which are of course less demanding than actually conceptual-
izing or even being disposed to conceptualize. But a takeaway point from this tension is
that the Al-Farabian view rests on making some kind of fairly deep functional distinction
between representations. Here, this distinction has come into conflict with the idea that we
utilize the same capacities across different representations. But this is merely an instance
of a broader conflict between a view of doxastic states as somewhat disjointed, and one on
which these states are re-combinable units in a flexible mental calculus.
5.5 Returning to the Cases
I’ll now come back to the cases of belief-like memory, and demonstrate how the Al-
Farabian view handles them. Rather than drag out the discussion of each one, I’ll focus
mainly on two representative cases: anomalous memories and thin memories. As a re-
minder, we had:
• Anomalous memories: A memory M of event P is treated as an anomaly when the
agent singles it out for selective consolidation and attention based in part on the fact
that P is surprising, unlikely or odd, and when the agent is at least sometimes not
disposed to draw inferences based on M because of P’s oddness.
• Thin memories: Memories which are extremely information-poor, requiring the de-
tails to be filled in with effort and background information (e.g. I have a sketchy
memory of a trip I took as a child, but the only way to recognize the event and string
the fragments into a narrative is to think very hard about where I could have been,
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who would have been there, and so on. )
Anomalous memories involve a tension in conceptualization. The thinker can conceptu-
alize the anomalous event itself quite well. On the other hand, fitting it into her other
memories and theories creates a problem; she can’t see how they fit together. Of course,
she can reject either the memory or some part of her other model of the world - in my ex-
ample, her conviction in her friend’s character. But these cases are marked by the sense that
there are other possible resolutions that are not yet able to be conceptualized. Similarly in
the Kuhnian case, the scientist can’t fit together the anomaly with her background theory,
but has a sense that there is something to be done with the anomaly in the future, or that
it’s a hint that something could be going on that she is not yet aware of. These descriptions
over-intellectualize the process, which is most often entirely opaque to the thinker, but this
is just to make the case fully explicit. Anomalous memories feature a conceptualization
that is vivid internally to the representation of the event, yet lacking (or seemingly lacking)
in relation to the broader representation. This challenge in conceptualization is not impos-
sible to resolve; there is the obvious solution of rejecting either part of the memory or part
of the broader representation. And yet, our thinker does not take this solution. Instead, she
undertakes a commitment to resolve the problem later, and in the meantime, be on the alert
for relevant evidence and take advantage of time to think through other possibilities. That
is, this degree of conceptualization is compatible with the more familiar commitment to
resolve inconsistency now, but this commitment is absent in the case of anomalous memo-
ries.
Fragile memories are similar, especially when the recalcitrance stems from a contra-
diction with other beliefs or memories; the main difference is that the implicit standing
commitment to taking the content to be at all accurate, a far weaker commitment than in
the anomalous memory case, is rejected upon retrieval. Recalcitrant memories may be
perfectly conceptualized, and we have a strong commitment to taking them to be true in
a wide variety of ways except for one crucial one - we don’t take them to be faithful.
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De-contextualized memories are so poorly conceptualized that they could not possible be
committed to, since they fail to describe the sort of thing that could be true or false.
Thin memories are more interesting, because they exploit the connection between com-
mitment and conceptualization in a similar way to anomalous memories. These memories,
like de-contextualized memories, are loosely conceptualized. On the other hand, they differ
in that we have both the ability as well as the propensity to construct a fuller conceptualiza-
tion. The ability to do so reflects a combination of the kind of conceptualization, and the
abilities and knowledge of the agent at the point of reconstruction. The propensity, on the
other hand, will presumably depend on the importance of the reconstruction to the thinker
relative to their other priorities, in just the same way that I can make many more inferences
from what I already know that I will actually make. This propensity may also be partly
explained by the memory itself; we could say that there is a default propensity to recon-
struct a memory, since the memory was originally formed with some kind of commitment
to its content, and the only way to realize this commitment would be to first reconstruct
the content. This relationship - where a partial conceptualization indicates an unfulfilled
commitment - can be altered and refined as the memory is reconstructed. As the thinker
begins to understand what the partially-remembered event actually was, she might realize
that what seemed to be a memory was actually a confused imagining, and thus no further
commitment would be called for, as in the case of fragile memories. On the other hand,
she may start to see that this event has crucial implications that she was ignorant of, and so
commit more strongly to the content and be more invested in reconstructing it fully. This
back-and-forth between reconstructing the content and evaluating it and its consequences
is an instance of the familiar observation in cognitive science: effective search involves an
integrated loop between retrieval and evaluation.
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5.5.1 Comparing the Taxonomies
It should not be particularly surprising or convincing that the Al-Farabian view can
accommodate these examples; after all, it has far more flexibility than either restrictive
theories of belief or the more flexible theories of belief-like states that I discussed above.
I will briefly compare how these cases can be treated under the accounts in section 5.3,
with the caveat that this is not meant to be an argument against those other accounts. Since
they have distinct aims from the view I’m developing, it would be odd to take the failure to
accommodate all kinds of memory cases as a mark against the theories.
On the fragmentation view, distant memories can be redescribed as beliefs given condi-
tions. However, many of these cases, such as thin memories, involve bilateral connections
between what is recalled and what elicits it; as we recall some of the details, we will
enhance the memory which in turn leads us to uncover further relevant recorded details,
as I’ve just described in the Al-Farabian framework. That is, no table of eliciting condi-
tions could describe these cases, since they involve a loop between eliciting conditions and
stored information that is iterated and moves in both directions. Further, how anomalous
memories and recalcitrant memories differ from paradigmatic belief can’t be diagnosed the
fragmentation view, since they do not differ in when they are elicited, but rather in how they
are used and updated. These objections derive from the fact that fragmentation plays with
the attitudes toward propositional contents, but does not give us tools to discuss differences
in the the representation. But we need differences in representations of the same propo-
sition in order to differentiate these memories, and to discuss thin and de-contextualized
memories that have genuinely, and obviously, non-standard contents.
On Audi’s dispositionalist view, we can in principle capture many of these phenomena
as some kind of disposition. For instance, anomalous memories are dispositions to believe
in some contexts, but not in the inferential context. Likewise, this account makes quite
good sense of thin memories, since it can appeal to the cognitive effort involved in filling
in the picture. De-contextualized and fragile memories might be more of a challenge, since
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they do not result in belief.
However, even were they to accommodate these belief-like phenomena, these accounts
all have a hard time separating defective states like the Capgras delusion from two other
categories: (a) states that are rational responses to information processing limitations, (b)
states that are rational for any kind of creature. But many memory phenomena fit into (a)
and possibly even (b). To see the contrast between the picture I am outlining and these al-
ternative strategies, consider, for instance, Egan’s claim about the normative superiority of
non in-between states: “The answer, very briefly, is that agents whose representations tend
to have something like the stereotypical roles will tend to do much better than those whose
representations tend to have intermediate, mix-and-match roles. We shouldn’t expect to
see the peculiar hybrid roles all over the place because they’re pretty maladaptive.” [37].
That is, neither theory tells us about why these kinds of belief-like states might be part of a
well-functioning epistemic life.
On the other hand, the way I’ve described the cases on the Al-Farabian view is the
start of a rational explanation. For instance, the diagnosis of thin memories shows how the
degree of conceptualization starts the thinker off with a prima facie reason to reconstruct,
given that it suggests a lost commitment. The description of how the process unfolds as a
loop between improving the conceptualization and evaluating what commitments are and
should be in place allows us to say that some instances of the process are more reason-
able than others, in the sense that they are more responsive to the commitments the thinker
has. This process may be entirely inaccessible, but it follows the kind of reasoning that
if accessible, would be evaluable. Whether this is enough for true rational evaluation is
controversial. But by appealing to a notion of commitment that is an extension of the one
we are already familiar with in paradigmatic belief, the Al-Farabian is in a good position
to make the case for the rational evaluability of cognitive commitment in general. Unfor-
tunately, this is beyond the scope of the present chapter. My aim here is only to show that
this medieval theory is a promising route to understanding the relationship between belief
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and neighboring states in memory and elsewhere in cognition.
5.6 You Only Are What You Believe?
Writing this paper, I was reminded of a folk song written by Phil Ochs, in which he
paints a picture of an absurdist anti-war strategy, that of giving up on sincere moral protest
and instead declaring, and believing, that the war is over. The song ends:
The gypsy fortune teller told me that we’d been deceived
You only are what you believe
I believe the war is over
It’s over, it’s over
I mention this song as a reminder that belief has a central place in the way we think of
ourselves now. The protester who believes that the war is over does not just see the world
in a certain way but expresses something radical, and even might bring about a change in
the world. The song about imagining the war to be over, or guessing that it’s over, would
not make the same point. 4
Even if you found the arguments of the preceding section persuasive, they leave un-
solved a serious issue. If we move from the contemporary picture of belief as the canonical
epistemic attitude, what would be lost? That is, belief has a special role to play in our
broader epistemology, and even ethics and metaphysics, and so by treating the category
of belief as a fairly arbitrary region of a more complex range of attitudes, the Al-Farabian
view may lead to untenable theoretical consequences.
In other words, belief has a special role (or roles) in our epistemology, and in connecting
epistemology to other areas. What are these special roles? While much has been said on
this question, I’ll focus on just three:
4This intuitive significance we associate with belief can also be seen through the use of ‘belief in’. I owe
this point to Peter Railton.
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1. primary agential role: Believing is an exercise of agency, which explains why we
can be held accountable for our beliefs (among other things)
2. secondary agential role: Belief guides our intentions, which explains in what way
we can be held accountable for our actions and their consequences.
3. epistemic role: Belief, when successful, becomes knowledge, which is the aim of
our epistemic lives.
The primary agential role is notably discussed by William Clifford[27], in The Ethics of
Belief ; Clifford distinguishes belief from attitudes short of belief such as suspicion or ac-
ceptance by the fact that we are distinctively ethically responsible for our beliefs. Others
rely on our beliefs, and we build our epistemic character from our practice of believing.
Clifford’s picture emphasizing the accountability we have for our beliefs themselves. The
other component of the primary agential role is about how beliefs are formed; in a recent
paper, Matthew Boyle[16] argues that belief is distinctively agential, even though it is not
an occurrent act, but a state sustained over time. Boyle and Clifford take up a very strong
position, that belief itself is ethically evaluable and an exercise in agency. More commonly
accepted is the weaker secondary agential role, in which belief guides intentional action,
and since intentional action itself is the subject of ethical (and practical) evaluation, this
places a derivative ethical or practical significance on belief. The epistemic role is im-
plicit in the literature of knowledge as belief plus some other conditions, though it has been
challenged by Williamson[95] and other proponents of knowledge-first epistemology.
On the Al-Farabian view, belief is one of many similar and interrelated attitudes that
play a range of related roles. This creates a prima facie tension with both the agential and
epistemic pictures in the following way. The agential view, most vividly in the primary
agential role as expressed by Clifford and Boyle, elevates belief categorically - all and only
belief has the relevant agential and ethical properties. Combining this with the Al-Farabian
account generates two explanatory problems: (a) why would the normative properties im-
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pose a sharp cut-off around a vague and fuzzy descriptive category? and (b) why would
only belief, as opposed to other combinations of assent and conceptualization bear these
normative properties?
The secondary agential role of belief generates an additional, more practical problem.
Consider our starting case of an anomalous memory: this state involved a deviation from
the norms of belief that require following through on inferring the probable consequences
of a belief when salient. This deviation results in acting differently than one would if one
believed the memory in a more paradigmatic sense. The secondary agential role posits
that belief guides intention, so this kind of case is troubling because it implies a lack of
guidance - or leniency in guidance. After all, this attitude, and many of the other types of
belief-like memory, by definition involve committed deviation from the norms regulating
belief, and thereby a potential deviation from guidance by reason itself. There are two ways
to treat this deviation: (a) as unguided, or (b) as guided by another belief or set of beliefs in
combination with desire and so on. Both options lead to further problems: (a) implies that
either these cases are defective, or the role of guidance is significantly more limited that we
might have thought, and (b) generates a difficult, and perhaps, intractable task of regulating
these varied commitments.
I cannot fully resolve these tensions here, but I will point to two avenues that might be
fruitful in re-configuring these undeniably important elements of our mental lives, agency
and epistemic value, to fit the pluralistic Al-Farabian account.
One attractive solution to the agency challenge is to argue that all commitments, not
just belief, are exercises in agency for the primary role, or foundations of agency for the
secondary role. One route uses the notion of commitment itself as the locus of agency.
After all, the notion of commitment is itself agential - a person makes a commitment, and
is bound by ethical norms as a result. Searle[79] controversially holds that commitments
such as promises are descriptive acts that generate normative consequences. This machin-
ery might be re-purposed for the case of cognitive commitments; just like promises, dox-
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astic states have ethical evaluability because of the descriptive features of the act combined
with background conditions. However, in Searle’s case (which is itself controversial), the
normative consequences only follow because of the institution of promising. So there are
at least two significant issues to be addressed. First, it’s unclear whether anything like an
institution could exist in the case of assent - though there might be some kind of substitute
in a Millikan-like theory of cognitive function, or in metacognition. Further, this structure
does not explain how we can evaluate making commitments in the first place, but only gives
us grounds for evaluating whether existing commitments should be satisfied.
In regards to the epistemic role, the tradition of classical Islamic epistemology might
have an answer. Al-Farabi’s own view of knowledge used the ingredients of conceptual-
ization and assent to define something incredibly demanding; knowledge is firm and non-
accidental assent to something necessarily true[12]5. This is a natural fit with Plato’s con-
trast between knowledge and opinion in the Republic. There, opinion (doxa) takes as its
object fragile, contingent facts - such as the color of a chair - whereas knowledge is of nec-
essary truths. For both Plato and Al-Farabi, knowledge is not only demanding in terms of
the relationship between the knower and the thing known, but also requires that the thing
known be of a certain kind beyond the kind of thing we normally believe or assent. On
this picture, the epistemic role of belief defined above needs to be redefined anyways; only
a very small subset of beliefs are even about the right kind of thing for knowledge. The
other beliefs, about contingent matters, surely play some kind of epistemic role, though
not the one specified above. Whether this is an instrumental role, oriented towards com-
ing to know about other things, or something else is beyond the scope of this paper. But
these older epistemological projects suggest a way to locate the epistemic role of the wider
variety of doxastic states presented in this chapter. That is, knowledge is on many views
extremely demanding, so demanding that for most of the questions that we consider, we
5Black actually includes belief as one component in this account from Al-Farabi’s Conditions of Certitude,
though she notes that Al-Farabi treats it as a common-sense linguistic category, and that knowledge is instead
defined in terms of assent in the commentary on the Prior Analytics, which I used to set up the view earlier.
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should already be in a position to see that our answer in the best case will not amount to
knowledge. If any of these everyday cases amount to belief, and if belief is distinguished
by a relationship with knowledge, then we already need to think of this relationship in more
indirect terms than ‘I believe P now in order for my belief to amount to knowledge now’.
Thus, moving from belief to other states in the space of assent and conceptualization does
not involve any kind of substantial weakening the relationship with knowledge. Instead,
what we already needed on the belief picture is made more obvious on the Al-Farabian
view: a theory to explain the epistemic value of states that are points on the way to knowl-
edge but not themselves candidates for knowledge 6
6The most familiar contemporary form of such a theory is epistemic consequentialism, but I will end by
sketching a different version of this kind of theory as developed by Al-Farabi’s most notable follower, Ibn
Sina (Avicenna). Roughly, Ibn Sina draws on Aristotle’s theory of potentiality to describe the process of
coming to know as actualization of potential. This potential adheres in the active intellect, which Ibn Sina
alternately describes as the heavenly intellect. This intellect, the thing that is actualized, the standard for
knowledge, doesn’t obtain merely internally as a goal, but has its own existence. It is what is actualized
when any knower comes to know, not a personal faculty of anyone in particular. On his analogy, a child
has some potential for writing by merely existing, but as he learns hand-coordination and words, he attains a
higher stage of potential. Further stages are actualized as he learns to write, and finally writes so often that
it becomes a habit. Thus, on Ibn Sina’s view, states in the space of assent and conceptualization partially
actualize the active intellect, or knowledge itself, without being themselves candidates for knowledge. This
notion of potential - where the potential is a sort of thing that is actualized but already always existed in some




This dissertation has investigated what it takes to learn about our environment over
time, and given the complex relationships between our mental representations, mental and
physical behaviors, and the possibility of acquiring more evidence. I hope to have shown
that memory has a part to play in this story that is neither simple nor derivative of other
cognitive systems. But I’d like to end on a note of caution.
This project endorses a kind of holism, where rational change over time cannot be
reduced to a series of independently rational transitions between time-slices, and represen-
tations over interrelated facts cannot be reduced to a series of independent ‘beliefs that P’.
Holism in this sense is contrasted with atomism, the view that more complex processes
should be understood as composites of smaller parts that can be analyzed for the most part
on their own. While I ultimately think a holistic view of the epistemology of learning and
memory is our best option, holism has some serious dangers.
Any kind of holism, by denying atomistic reduction, is at least prima facie less simple
than atomism. Holism can also be mystical and un-explanatory by withholding the possi-
bility of reductive explanation. And worse, it can be cheap. After all, it is easier to convince
people that things are more complicated than they appear than that they are simpler - in a
sense, simplicity and reduction are theoretical achievements, whereas holism is a step away
from these achievements. We might also worry that holism is hard to escape; once things
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have been muddied, interdependent and complicated, it becomes more difficult to falsify
the theory.
So the bar for adopting a holistic theory should be very high. To my mind, the case
for the kind of diachronic holism I’ve advanced rests on two features. There should be
a compensatory explanatory advantage, and the inquiry should be responsive to a wider
variety of potentially challenging evidence. Or in simpler terms, the only reason to go in
for holism despite these flaws is if it gives us insights that were otherwise unreachable, and
can be falsified by a range of available data so that we do not accept it too easily.
On the former point, I hope to have shown that this holistic picture gives us insight
into previously unexplored dynamic structures, not just the ability to describe some new
cases. For instance, the exploration/exploitation trade-off in Chapter III, or the conceptu-
alization/commitment model of doxastic states in Chapter V are steps towards holism that
are also supposed to provide a way to schematize and predict. As opposed to a holism that
replaces atomist reduction with the claim that the phenomenon in question is deeply par-
ticular and impossible to factor, this kind of holism aspires to introduce new explanatory
machinery.
On the latter point, this project built rational theories inspired by empirical observations,
and aimed to hold these theories up to empirical scrutiny. As opposed to more theoretical
philosophical models of memory, my picture is subject to falsification; since I motivated
many of the steps by appealing to how things work in successful agents, finding out that
things work quite differently than I have described, or that these agents are not so successful
after all, would make my view far less plausible. So while holism has a genuine problem
with falsification, if holism is part of what makes this project empirically applicable, holism
also makes this project subject to empirical falsification and constraint.
In conclusion, I have shown how a diachronic picture of rationality is both genuinely
different from a synchronic one, and makes contact with a wide and exciting range of
empirical findings. This dissertation is an initial step towards a holistic theory of learning
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